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FALLING THROUGH THE CRACKS:  THE 
SHORTCOMINGS OF VICTIM AND WITNESS 
PROTECTION UNDER § 1512 OF THE FEDERAL 
VICTIM AND WITNESS PROTECTION ACT 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the complicated world of criminal law, federal, state, and local 
officials must often cooperate to ensure proper investigation and 
potential prosecution of federal crimes.1  Local authorities often rely on 
federal agencies to provide assistance during investigations of the 
commission of federal crimes.2  Essential to these investigations and 
prosecutions is the cooperation of victims and witnesses.3  In turn, 
victims and witnesses of federal crimes are entitled to be adequately 
protected throughout the entire process.4  Congress enacted the federal 
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (“VWPA”) to better ensure 
such protection.5  However, many victims continue to fall through the 
cracks and are not adequately protected against intimidation and witness 
tampering.  This is especially true when a person is a victim or a witness 
of a federal crime that initially is reported to local officials, upon which 
federal authorities eventually investigate.  In such a scenario, United 
States Courts of Appeals disagree as to whether victims and witnesses 
are covered under the VWPA.6 
To illustrate, consider Mark Sponslor, a family man with a wife and 
two children.7  One morning, while walking to the bus stop, he witnesses 
two men acting suspiciously.  Before the two men become aware that 
Mark is approaching the bus stop, one removes a firearm and shoots the 
other, making Mark a witness of a violent crime involving a firearm.  The 
perpetrator flees the scene before local police arrive.  Mark cooperates 
fully with the officials and agrees to assist them in the future if needed.  
                                                 
1 Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (Oct. 12, 
1982) [“VWPA”].  See also President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime: Final Report 114, 
(1982), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/presdntstskforcrprt/ 
87299.pdf [hereinafter President’s Task Force]. 
2 Brendan Kearney, Federal Appeals Court Affirms Witness Intimidation Convictions, DAILY 
REC., Aug. 23, 2007. 
3  S. Rep. No. 97-532, at 9 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515-16.  See also 
VWPA, supra note 1. 
4 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Victim Assistance: Rights of Federal Crime Victims, 
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/victimassist/crimevictims.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2008).  
See also  S. Rep. No. 97-532, supra note 3; President’s Task Force, supra note 1, at 11. 
5 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2006).  See also VWPA, supra note 1; S. Rep. No. 97-532, supra note 3. 
6 See infra Part III (analyzing the interpretation of § 1512 to preclude protection in some 
cases where state and local authorities initiate the investigation). 
7 The hypothetical is the contribution of the author of this Note. 
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During the initial investigation, local police discover evidence linking the 
shooting to gang facilitated drug trafficking—a larger epidemic in the 
area.  Investigators are able to identify the victim of the shooting as a 
prominent member in a gang known for distributing drugs throughout 
the area.  The victim is unconscious, and police are therefore unable to 
question him regarding the shooting.  However, other evidence points to 
another prominent gang member, Max Rissen, and police recover 
evidence suggesting that the shooting was possibly related to drug 
activity.  Local investigators begin to anticipate the need to request 
federal assistance in the matter and contact federal officials in 
anticipation of such need. 
Meanwhile, local investigators contact Mark to request that he help 
them identify the perpetrator of the shooting at a police lineup later that 
week.  Before local police are able to detain Max, Max discovers the 
identity of Mark and firebombs Mark’s house in an effort to prevent 
Mark from identifying him as the shooter.  This attack occurs before 
federal officials become officially involved in investigating the shooting.  
A short time later, federal authorities begin to investigate the shooting 
and related drug activity.  Local and federal investigators are able to 
determine, through a joint investigation, that drugs were a major cause 
of the shooting.  Also, federal officials discover that Max is a convicted 
felon, making his possession of a firearm a federal offense.  Mark 
continues to communicate with local authorities throughout the entire 
joint investigation.  Based significantly on Mark’s testimony, the federal 
prosecutor then takes the case to a grand jury.  Max is later convicted of 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and several federal drug 
crimes.8  The prosecutor decides to also charge Max with witness 
intimidation under § 1512 of the VWPA.9 
The proper test to determine when to provide protection to victims 
and witnesses of federal crimes is whether a sufficient federal nexus 
exists.10  This hypothetical illustrates the situation that led to the circuit 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 841 (2006) (proscribing certain drug related offenses); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 844 (2006) (proscribing simple possession of a controlled substance); 18 U.S.C. § 846 
(2006) (proscribing conspiracy to commit drug crimes); 18 U.S.C. § 931 (2006) (proscribing 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon). 
9 See infra Part II.B (discussing why the scope of the VWPA includes such acts as the 
firebombing of Mark’s house).  Many states have also adopted statutes which provide for 
victim and witness protection and some have passed amendments to their constitutions 
providing for victims’ rights.  Richard Barajas & Scott Alexander Nelson, The Proposed 
Crime Victims’ Federal Constitutional Amendment: Working Toward a Proper Balance, 49 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 1 (1997); Davya B. Gewurz & Maria A. Mercurio, The Victims’ Bill of Rights:  Are 
Victims all Dressed UP With No Place to Go?, 8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 251, 267 (1992). 
10 See infra Part III (analyzing the current confusion surrounding the federal nexus 
requirement of the Act). 
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split regarding whether such a nexus exists.  While Congress may have 
enacted the VWPA to ensure protection for people like Mark, some 
courts would conclude that Mark is not entitled to protection under the 
Act.11  Those same courts would find that a sufficient federal nexus to 
bring Mark under the protection of the Act did not exist at the time when 
the perpetrator attacked and threatened Mark in order to prevent his 
further cooperation with the authorities investigating the crime, because 
the acts of intimidation occurred prior to the determination that federal 
crimes were involved.12  However, other courts would find a federal 
nexus and convict the defendant for witness intimidation under the Act 
because federal crimes were involved and information shared by Mark 
with local authorities was likely to be communicated to a federal 
officer.13 
This lack of uniformity among the circuits indicates the need for an 
amendment to § 1512 of the VWPA which provides for:  (1) protection of 
witnesses and victims whose information regarding the commission of a 
federal crime was transferred to federal officers, and (2) a balancing of 
factors in determining what constitutes a sufficient nexus so as to supply 
protection to victims of most federal crimes regardless of the authorities 
to whom those victims initially reported the crime.14 
The purpose of this Note is to advocate an amendment to § 1512 of 
the VWPA in order to comport with the stated intent of Congress to 
ensure integrity throughout the entire criminal justice process and 
provide adequate protection to victims and witnesses of federal crimes.15  
Part II discusses the history of the VWPA and the different approaches 
used by courts to determine what constitutes a sufficient federal nexus.16  
Specifically, Part II discusses the scope of § 1512 of the Act as it pertains 
to the intent and jurisdictional elements of § 1512 and the current circuit 
split regarding the federal nexus requirement of the Act.17  Next, Part III 
discusses the inefficiency of approaches by circuit courts today to 
determine whether a defendant may be prosecuted under § 1512.18  
                                                 
11 See infra Part II.D (discussing decisions of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
regarding § 1512 of the VWPA). 
12 See infra Part II.D. 
13 See infra Part II.D (discussing decisions of the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits Courts of 
Appeals regarding the federal nexus requirement of § 1512). 
14 See infra Part IV (proposing an amendment to § 1512 of the VWPA). 
15 See infra Part IV (proposing an amendment to § 1512 of the VWPA).  See also infra notes 
29–31 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative purpose behind the enactment of 
the VWPA). 
16 See infra Part II.A (discussing the history of the VWPA). 
17 See infra Part II. 
18 See infra Part III (analyzing the current problems associated with the differing 
interpretations of the federal nexus requirement of § 1512). 
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Finally, Part IV proposes an amendment to the current statute that 
comports more fully with the intent of the statute.19 
II.  BACKGROUND:  WITNESS PROTECTION UNDER § 1512 OF THE FEDERAL 
VICTIM AND WITNESS PROTECTION ACT 
Congress enacted the VWPA to broaden protection provided to 
victims and witnesses of federal crimes.20  Initially, due to the 
restructuring and revision of earlier witness protection statutes because 
of the passage of the VWPA, courts disagreed about the scope of § 1512 
of the Act in relation to the former statutes.21  Once the courts 
determined the scope of § 1512, the focus shifted to interpreting specific 
elements within the Section.22  Part II.A first discusses the history of the 
VWPA.23  Part II.B then discusses the scope of § 1512 of the VWPA in 
relation to the former witness protection statute.24  Part II.C discusses the 
intent and jurisdictional elements of § 1512.25  Finally, Part II.D discusses 
the current circuit split regarding the VWPA’s federal nexus 
requirement.26 
A. Restructuring and Expanding the Protection of Federal Victims and 
Witnesses 
During a period of increasing public awareness of victims’ rights, 
brought forth by the “Victims’ Rights Movement,”27 Congress enacted 
                                                 
19 See infra Part IV. 
20 See infra Part II.A (discussing the purpose of § 1512). 
21 See infra Part II.B (discussing the scope of § 1512 in relation to § 1503). 
22 See infra Part II.C (discussing the intent and jurisdictional elements of § 1512). 
23 See infra Part II.A. 
24 See infra Part II.B. 
25 See infra Part II.C. 
26 See infra Part II.D. 
27 See generally VWPA, supra note 1 (noting national awareness of the plight of victims’ 
and the need for legislation to provide protection for these victims); President’s Task Force, 
supra note 1, at 5 (reporting on victim disillusionment with the criminal justice system); 
ABA Criminal Justice Section, Reducing Victim/Witness Intimidation: A Package 1 (1981) 
(proposing a model statute protecting victims’ rights in criminal proceedings); Barajas & 
Alexander Nelson, supra note 9 (discussing the historical role of victims and victims’ rights 
amendments to state constitutions); Andrew J. Karmen, Who’s Against Victims’ Right? The 
Nature of the Opposition to Pro-Victim Initiatives in Criminal Justice, 8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL 
COMMENT. 157 (1992);  Karyn Ellen Polito, The Rights of Crime Victims in the Criminal Justice 
System: Is Justice Blind to the Victims of Crime?, 16 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 241 (1990) (discussing the rights of victims in criminal investigations and 
proceedings); Steven D. Walker, History of the Victims’ Movement in the United States, 
http://aabss.org/journal2000/f04Walker.jmm.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2008) (discussing 
the emergence of the Victims’ Movement in the United States); Marlene A. Young, The 
Victims Movement:  A Confluence of Forces, National Symposium on Victims of Federal 
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the VWPA of 1982.28  In response to findings indicating that victims and 
witnesses of federal crimes were not afforded proper protection under 
then-existing law, Congress passed the VWPA in order to provide better 
protection and assistance to victims and witnesses of criminal activity.29  
Specifically, recognizing that witness cooperation and participation is 
essential to effectiveness of the criminal justice system, Congress added 
18 U.S.C § 1512 to then-existing federal witness tampering law, namely 
18 U.S.C. § 1503, which broadened the definition of witness tampering 
and extended protection to a broader range of persons in order to 
safeguard the integrity of the judicial system and encourage witness 
participation in all stages of federal investigations and proceedings.30 
                                                                                                             
Crime, http://www.trynova.org/victiminfo/readings/VictimsMovement.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 7, 2008) (discussing the development of the victim protection laws). 
28 See S. Rep. No. 97-532, supra note 3, at 9 (1982), (noting President Regan’s effort to 
bring national attention to victims’ rights).  See also Barajas & Nelson, supra note 9, at 2 
(discussing  how increased public awareness of victims’ rights starting in the 1970s, 
President Regan’s focus on victims’ rights in the early 1980s and the formation of national 
organizations in support of victims brought about suggestions for a constitutional 
amendment protecting victims’ rights in criminal proceedings and discussing state 
constitutional amendments passed in twenty-nine states); Gewurz & Mercurio, supra note 9 
(discussing the need for a constitutional amendment securing victims’ rights in criminal 
proceedings); Jeremy McLaughlin & Joshua M. Nahum, Obstruction of Justice, 44 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 793, 812 (2007) (noting that Congress enacted the VWPA in response to growing 
concerns that the judicial system did not provide sufficient protection to victims and 
witnesses of crimes); Teresa Anne Pesce, Defining Witness Tampering Under 18 U.S.C., 
Section 1512, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1417 (1986) (noting that Congress passed the VWPA in 
response to growing concerns that previous witness tampering statutes did not provide 
sufficient protection to victims). 
29 S. Rep. No. 97-532, supra note 3, at 9.  See also VWPA, supra note 1.  The Senate Report 
also recognized that most serious violent crimes fall under state and local jurisdiction.  S. 
Rep. No. 97-532, supra note 3, at 9.  Thus, the purpose of the VWPA is to supplement state 
and local laws and provide protection to victims of and witnesses to the commission or 
possible commission of federal crimes.  Id.  One of the main purposes of § 1512, outside of 
the desire to provide broader protection to victims and witnesses, is to protect the integrity 
of the federal judicial system and any investigations ancillary to that system.  Id. 
 For purposes of the rights and services provided to victims and witness of federal 
crimes, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has defined “crime victim” as “a person who 
has been directly and proximately harmed (physically, emotionally, or financially) as a 
result of the commission of a federal offense . . . .”  Federal Bureau of Investigation, Victim 
Assistance: Rights of Federal Crime Victims, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/victimassist/ 
crimevictims.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2008). 
30 See 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1503.  See also VWPA, supra note 1 (noting that 
“the Federal government . . . has an important leadership role to assume in ensuring that 
victims of crime, whether at the Federal, State, or local level[]” are adequately protected in 
order to facilitate the cooperation of the victim in the criminal justice system).  The Senate 
Report determined that “[w]ithout the cooperation of victims and witnesses, the criminal 
justice system would simply cease to function and few criminals, if any, would be brought 
to justice.”  S. Rep. No. 97-532, supra note 3, at 9.  The VWPA also includes additional 
provisions providing, among other things, punishment for retaliation against victims, 
Hart: Falling Through the Cracks: The Shortcomings of Victim and Witnes
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
776 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
When first passed, the VWPA came under harsh criticism from 
opponents claiming the Act impinged on defendants’ due process 
rights.31  However, § 1512 has withstood constitutional attack in federal 
courts.32  Federal courts have held that the statute is not 
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad and is consistent with the 
Necessary and Proper Clause of the United States Constitution.33  
Additionally, because the Act provides fair notice to potential 
                                                                                                             
victim restitution, and guidelines for the fair treatment of witnesses in the system.  
VWPA, supra note 1  
 In addition to federal legislative action to broaden protection provided to victims and 
witnesses, many states have passed constitutional amendments providing rights to 
victims.  Barajas & Nelson, supra note 9, at 11; National Organization for Victim 
Assistance, Crime Victim & Witness Rights: NOVA Promotion of Crime Victim Rights, 
http://www.trynova.org/about/victimrights.html.  Also, many states have passed 
legislation to ensure protection to victims and witnesses of crimes.  Gewurz & Mercurio, 
supra note 9, at 251-252.  See also National Center for Victims of Crimes, Victims and Crimes 
Included in the Victims’ Rights Laws, http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/AGP.Net/Components/ 
documentviewer/Download.aspxnz?DocumentID=32568 (last visited Aug 26, 2008) 
(listing various state legislative enactments of victims’ rights laws passed before 1995). 
31 See generally William H. Jeffress, Jr., The New Federal Witness Tampering Statute, 22 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 17 (1984) (arguing that § 1512 is unconstitutional because it is overbroad in 
that it may encompass lawful behavior and also arguing that the section impermissibly 
shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to prove that he acted lawfully under the 
statute); Karmen, supra note 27 (discussing opposition to the Victims’ Rights Movement).  
Other commentators suggest that the Victims’ Rights Movement exacerbates class and 
racial divisions and ignores an accused person’s right to be presumed innocent.  See 
Kenneth Henley, The Role of the Victim in Criminal Law, Fla. Int’l U. Faculty Lunchtime 
Symposium Presentation, at 2 (Feb. 22, 2001), http://www.fiu.edu/~ippcs/henley.htm. 
32 Cheryl Anne Adams, White-Collar Crime:  Fourth Survey of Law: Substantive Crimes: 
Witness Tampering, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 755, 755-56 (1987).  See generally Eric C. Surette, 
Annotation, Construction and Application of Federal Witness Tampering Statute, 185 A.L.R. FED. 
1 (2003). 
33 Many cases have decided that § 1512 is not unconstitutionally vague.  United States v. 
Tyler, 281 F.3d 84 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 858 (2002); United States v. Shotts, 145 
F.3d 1289, 1300 (11th Cir. 1998), cert denied, 534 U.S. 896 (2001); United States v. Jackson, 986 
F.Supp. 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), cert denied, 530 U.S. 1267 (2000); United States v. Porter, 977 
F.Supp. 679, 682 (M.D. Pa. 1997); United States v. Bergerstock, 1994 WL 449019, 3 (N.D.N.Y. 
1994) (holding that § 1512 is not facially vague); United States v. Kalevas, 622 F.Supp. 1523, 
1527 (D.C.N.Y. 1985). 
 Several cases have held that § 1512 is not overbroad.  United States v. Thompson, 76 
F.3d 442 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that § 1512 is not unconstitutionally overbroad); United 
States v. Bergerstock, 1994 WL 449019, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that § 1512 is not 
facially overbroad or vague); United States v. Wilson, 565 F.Supp. 1416 (D.C.N.Y. 1983) 
(holding that § 1512 is not unconstitutionally overbroad). 
 Also, the circuits have held that § 1512 does not violate the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.  United States v. Tyler, 281 F.3d 84 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that § 1512 does not 
violate the Necessary and Proper Clause of the United States Constitution because it is 
consistent with Congress’s authority to punish crimes and regulate court procedures); 
United States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that § 1512 did not exceed 
Congress’ power in violation of the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
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defendants, in that its plain language sets forth the prohibition of 
preventing witnesses from providing information or testifying regarding 
federal crimes or in federal proceedings, courts have held that the VWPA 
does not violate a defendant’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.34  In 
addition to resolving the constitutionality of the Act, courts have 
addressed its scope.35     
B. Scope of § 1512 of the VWPA 
Before the passage of the VWPA, Congress provided for witness 
protection primarily through 18 U.S.C. § 1503.36  Section 1503 required a 
specific intent to intimidate a person who would actually be a witness in 
a pending proceeding.37  Thus, § 1503 provided protection to a small 
number of persons involved in investigations and proceedings.38  
However, § 1512 was added to VWPA to extend protection to a broader 
range of witnesses and prohibit a broader range of actions.39   
                                                 
34 See Tyler, 281 F.3d at 94 (holding that even though “Congress plainly intended to omit 
a state-of-mind requirement with regard to the federal connection[,]” the statute is not 
unconstitutional because it clearly states the conduct which would fall within the purview 
of the statute), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 858 (2002); Shotts, 145 F.3d at1300 (holding that the 
word “corrupt” provides adequate notice to defendants of what conduct is prohibited), 
cert. denied 525 U.S. 1177 (1998); Kalevas, 622 F.Supp. at 1527 (holding that § 1512 provides 
adequate notice to possible defendants because it defines with sufficient clarity conduct 
which would constitute intimidation and misleading conduct that would violate the Act) 
(citing Wilson, 565 F.Supp. at 1430–31). 
35 See infra Part II.B (discussing the scope of § 1512). 
36 Pesce, supra note 28, at 1420 (stating that prior to 1982, § 1503 provided the primary 
protection for witnesses).  See also Tina M. Riley, Tampering with Witness Tampering:  
Resolving the Quandary Surrounding 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1512, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 249 (1999) 
(stating that prior to 1982, § 1503 was the most frequently invoked statute for prosecution 
of witness tampering). 
37 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2006).  See also United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995); infra Part 
II.C.2; Pesce, supra note 28, at 1419–20.  Prior to 1982, the government had to prove a 
defendant acted with the specific intent to influence a witness and that the witness was 
actually participating in a pending judicial proceeding.  Pesce, supra note 28, at 1419–20. 
38 Id. at 1420.  In order to be prosecuted under § 1503 prior to 1982, a “defendant must 
have sought to influence a person who actually would be, or who the defendant believed 
would be, a witness in the pending proceeding.”  Id.  Currently, § 1503 requires that the 
government establish that a defendant “endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede” a 
juror, officer or judge from fulfilling her official obligations at “any examination or other 
proceeding . . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (2006).  Thus, current witness protection under § 1503 
is still limited to persons participating in pending proceedings.  Pesce, supra note 28, at 
1420. 
39 Id.  Section 1512 of VWPA protects “any person” who may communicate information 
regarding a federal offense even prior to the commencement of an official proceeding.  18 
U.S.C. § 1512 (2006).  After the enactment of § 1512, Congress revised § 1503 by removing 
the term witness from that section.  Brain M. Haney, Contrasting the Prosecution of Witness 
Tampering Under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 and 18 U.S.C. § 1512:  Why § 1512 Better Serves the 
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The witness tampering provisions of § 1512 of the VWPA set forth 
punishment for anyone who knowingly attempts—through murder, 
attempted murder, physical force, threat of physical force, or through 
intimidation—to prevent any person from communicating or providing 
information relating to the commission or possible commission of a 
federal crime to a law enforcement officer.40  The government establishes 
                                                                                                             
Government at Trial, 9 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP.  ADVOC. 57, 63 (2004).  Congress left § 1503’s 
residual omnibus intact, however, which initially caused courts to grapple with the exact 
scope of the newly enacted § 1512.  Pesce, supra note 28, at 1422–23. 
 Congress enacted VWPA to “clarify ambiguities and cure deficiencies” of witness 
protection under § 1503. Id. at 1418.  See also Haney, supra note 39, at 63 (discussing § 1503’s 
limitations as a method to adequately prosecute defendants accused of witness tampering); 
McLaughlin & Nahum, supra note 28, at 810 (noting that Congress enacted VWPA to 
provide better protection than that provided under § 1503 prior to 1982). 
40 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2006).  The statute states: 
(a)(1) Whoever kills or attempts to kill another person, with intent to— . . .  
(C) prevent the communication by any person to a law 
enforcement officer or judge of the United States of 
information relating to the commission or possible 
commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions 
of probation, parole, or release pending judicial proceedings; 
shall be punished as provided in paragraph (3). 
(2) Whoever uses physical force or the threat of physical force 
against any person, or attempts to do so, with intent to— . . .  
(C) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law 
enforcement officer or judge of the United States of 
information relating to the commission or possible 
commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions 
of probation, supervised release, parole, or release pending 
judicial proceedings; shall be punished as provided in 
paragraph (3). . . 
(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, threatens, 
or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or 
engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent 
to— . . . 
(3) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law 
enforcement officer or judge of the United States of 
information relating to the commission or possible 
commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions 
of probation, supervised release [sic], parole, or release 
pending judicial proceedings; shall be fined under this title 
or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. 
(c) Whoever corruptly— 
(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, 
document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the 
intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in 
an official proceeding; or  
(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official 
proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned . . . . 
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intent by proving that the defendant knowingly attempted to use or 
threaten to use force with the intent to prevent communication with a 
federal officer regarding a federal crime or proceeding, regardless of 
whether the defendant specifically knew that the proceeding was federal 
in nature or that the officer was a federal agent.41  Also, the government 
                                                                                                             
(d) Whoever intentionally harasses another person and thereby 
hinders, delays, prevents, or dissuades any person from —. . .  
(2) reporting to a law enforcement officer or judge of the 
United States the commission or possible commission of a 
Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation 
supervised release [sic], parole, or release pending judicial 
proceedings; . . .  
or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than 3 years, or both. 
18 U.S.C.§§ 1512(a)(1)(C), (a)(2)(C), (b)(3), (c)(1)–(2), (d)(2) (2006). 
 While debating the passage of this act, Congress recognized that “a criminal case often 
involves people who will never testify in open court, but who act as confidential 
informants, provide background information, or give hearsay statements.”  Haney, supra 
note 39, at 62.  Congress passed § 1512 of the VWPA with the intent to extend protection to 
those people intertwined with the witness function.  Id. at 59.  The original enactment did 
not provide for protection for victims against murder; but in 1986, Congress enacted an 
amendment which added killing and attempting killing to prohibited acts used to 
intimidate witnesses.  Criminal Law and Procedural Technical Amendments Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-646, 1986 Stat. 1236 (codified as 18 U.S.C § 1512(a)).  The 1986 enactment also 
added technical amendments.  Id. 
 At the time of publication several proposed amendments § 1512 were pending in 
Congress.  See S. 1946, 110th Cong (2007); H.R. 3887, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 456, 110th Cong. 
(2007); S. 1946, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 378, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 447, 110th Cong. (2007).  A 
few of the proposed amendments merely make technical or conforming changes to the 
language of § 1512 and do not affect the substance of the Act.  S. 456, 110th Cong. (2007).  
Two proposals would change the sentencing provisions of the Act, increasing the 
maximum penalty and striking the death penalty.  S. 378, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 447, 110th 
Cong. (2007).  The Public Corruption Prosecution Act would amend § 1512(i) to state that 
any prosecution under the Chapter could be brought in the district in which the act 
occurred, instead of simply providing for §§ 1512 and 1503.  S. 1946, 110th Cong. (2007). 
Finally, William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2007 
would provide several provisions related to the disclosure of information regarding a 
violation of an employment visa or labor and employment law.  H.R. 3887, 110th Cong. 
(2007). 
41 18 U.S.C. § 1512(g) (2006).  The section states: 
(g) [i]n a prosecution for an offense under this section, no state of mind 
need be proved with respect to the circumstance— 
(1) that the official proceeding before a judge . . . or government 
agency  is before a judge or court of United States . . . or a Federal 
Government Agency; or 
(2) that the judge is a judge of the United States or that the law 
enforcement officer is an officer or employee of the Federal 
Government or a person authorized to act for or on the behalf of the 
Federal Government or serving the Federal Government as an adviser 
or consultant. 
Hart: Falling Through the Cracks: The Shortcomings of Victim and Witnes
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
780 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
need not show that an official proceeding was pending or that one was 
about to be instituted at the time of the attempted intimidation.42  
However, the government must prove that the defendant acted with 
knowledge that his actions could affect a witness’ communication 
regarding a current or future federal proceeding.43 
Congress revised former § 1503 by removing the word “witness” in 
order to provide a comprehensive scheme for witness protection under 
§ 1512.44  However, Congress did not delete § 1503’s omnibus clause, 
which provided a general prohibition against obstruction of justice.45  
                                                                                                             
18 U.S.C. § 1512(g) (2006).  This language is consistent with Congressional intent to provide 
broader protection to victims and witnesses from conduct not protected under § 1503.  S. 
Rep. No. 97-532, supra note 3, at 9 (stating the purpose of the VWPA “is to strengthen 
existing legal protections for victims and witnesses of Federal crimes”).  See also United 
States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233, 1247 (11th Cir. 1998) (discussing legislative intent to “expand 
the existing ‘obstruction of justice’ statutory scheme by enacting § 1512[]”). 
42 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f) (2006).  This section of the Act states:  “For purposes of this 
section—(1) an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instated at the time 
of the offense; and (2) the testimony, or the record, document, or other object need not be 
admissible in evidence or free of a claim of privilege.” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(g) (2006). 
43 See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) (2006) (stating that a defendant must have acted with the 
intent to  “prevent the communication by any person” to federal law enforcement or judges 
regarding a federal crime); 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(2)(C) (2006) (stating a defendant must act 
with the intent to “hinder, delay, or prevent” communication to federal authorities 
regarding a federal offense); 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) (2006) (stating that a defendant must 
knowingly use intimidation, threats, corrupt persuasion, or misleading conduct toward 
someone with then intent to obstruct a federal investigation or proceeding); and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1512(d)(2) (2006) (stating that a defendant must intend to harass a person resulting in 
obstruction to federal proceedings or investigations). 
44 Haney, supra note 39, at 63.  Congress recognized a need to simplify and streamline 
prosecutions of witness tampering under one comprehensive act.  Id.  However, the 
Supreme Court has not specifically stated that the change in the language of § 1503 
removed all protection against witness tampering from that Section.  Shelby A.D. Moore, 
Who is Keeping the Gate? What do we do when Prosecutors Breach the Ethical Responsibilities They 
Have Sworn to Uphold?, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 801, 842 (2006) (noting that Congress has clearly 
stated in the respective statutes what it intended to criminalize). 
45 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2006).  The current statute reads: 
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter 
or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any 
grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States . . . 
or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or 
impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due 
administration of justice, shall be punished . . .  
18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2006) (emphasis added).  However, the  pre-VWPA version of § 1503 read: 
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter 
or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any 
witness, in any court of the United States . . . or endeavors to influence, 
obstruct or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be [punished]. 
18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1948) (amended 1982) (emphasis added).  See also Pesce, supra note 28, at 
1422.  The current Omnibus Clause of § 1503 is most typically used in white-collar cases 
which do not usually involve the type of witness tampering conduct specifically proscribed 
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Initial judicial interpretation of § 1512 focused on its scope in reference to 
§ 1503’s omnibus clause.46  Some courts interpreted § 1512 to provide 
exclusive protection for witnesses.47  Other courts held that § 1512 
provided protection for only that conduct enumerated in the statute and 
did not preclude some forms of witness tampering from being 
prosecuted under § 1503.48  Congress responded to this ambiguity by 
amending § 1512 in 1988 to add to the Act a prohibition against corruptly 
persuading a witness.49  Thus, Congress provided a mechanism for the 
government to prosecute conduct not specifically enumerated in the 
original enactment of § 1512 which also fell outside the reach of the 
omnibus clause of § 1503.50  Since the enactment of the 1988 amendment, 
                                                                                                             
under § 1512.  Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code” Is a Disgrace:  Obstruction 
Statutes as a Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 686 (2006).   
46 E.g., United States v. Risken, 788 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1986) (discussing congressional 
enactment of § 1512 and revisions of § 1503); United States v. King, 762 F.2d 232, 237 (2d 
Cir. 1985) (stating § 1512 reached only specified means of intimidation); United States v. 
Wesley, 748 F.2d 962, 964 (5th Cir.. 1984) (holding that prosecutions for witness tampering 
can be brought under both §§ 1503 and  1512).  See also Pesce, supra note 28, at 1422 (arguing 
that Congress meant § 1512 to be the exclusive protection for witnesses against 
intimidation and tampering). 
47 E.g., United States v. Hernandez, 730 F.2d 895, 898 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that 
prosecutions for witness tampering must be brought under § 1512 exclusively).  See also 
Pesce, supra note 28, at 1423 (listing three approaches courts used to interpret § 1512 in 
relation to § 1503); Riley, supra note 36, at 259–65 (discussing different approaches of Circuit 
Courts of Appeals regarding whether prosecutions for witness tampering fell exclusively 
under § 1512 and arguing that Congress intended that § 1512 be the sole remedy for 
witness tampering). 
48 E.g., United States v. Kenny, 973 F.2d 339, 342 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that enactment 
of § 1512 does not preclude application of § 1503 to acts that obstruct justice as long as the 
defendant is not prosecuted on both statutes.); United States v. Shively, 927 F.2d 804, 811 
(5th Cir. 1991) (holding that § 1512 reaches only those acts specifically numerated in the 
Act); Risken, 788 F.2d 1361  (holding that prosecutions for witness tampering could be 
brought under §§ 1503 or 1512) (citing United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1984)); 
Wesley, 748 F.2d 962 (holding that prosecutions for witness  tampering can be brought 
under both §§ 1503 and 1512).  But see also Pesce, supra note 28, at 1423 (rejecting the 
reasoning of the Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits holding that prosecutions for witness 
tampering can be brought under both § 1503 and § 1512). 
49 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2006) (as amended 1988).  The relevant section of the pre-1988 
version of § 1512(b) reads: “Whoever intentionally harasses another person and thereby 
hinders, delays, prevents or dissuades any person” from participating in federal 
proceedings or from communicating to a federal officer shall be punished.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 1512(b) (1986).  See also United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 597 (1995) (discussing the 
appellate courts application of the pre-1988 version of § 1512).  See also supra note 41 
(quoting the current language of § 1512 relevant to this Note). 
50 Haney, supra note 39, at 66 (stating that, by enacting this 1988 amendment, Congress 
intended to provide witness and victim protection exclusively under § 1512).  Most circuit 
courts still allow prosecution of witness tampering under both §§ 1512 and 1503.  See 
United States v. Ladum, 141 F.3d 1328, 1338 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing that the 1988 
amendment to § 1512 did not repeal the omnibus clause of § 1503 and that both sections are 
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courts have generally limited the applicability of § 1512 to conduct 
specifically enumerated within the statute.51  Therefore, defendants can 
be prosecuted only for conduct enumerated within the statute.52  
Moreover, in order for the government to prosecute such conduct, it 
must also establish the requisite intent and jurisdiction.53 
C. Intent and Jurisdiction Under § 1512 
While Congress and the courts settled the issue of the general scope 
of § 1512 in conjunction with § 1503, courts also focused on discussion of 
the requisite elements needed for a successful prosecution under 
§ 1512.54  The language of two major elements of § 1512 have consistently 
presented questions for courts since the enactment of the VWPA.55  First, 
the Act requires the government to establish that the defendant 
performed any of the proscribed conduct with the intent to interfere with 
                                                                                                             
coexistent); United States v. Tackett, 113 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that Congress 
did not intend to preclude the use of § 1503 when it passed § 1512); United States v. 
Maloney, 71 F.3d 645, 659 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that, so long as a defendant is not 
prosecuted under both sections, Congress’s enactment of § 1512 does not preclude 
prosecution for witness tampering under § 1503); United States v. Moody, 977 F.2d 1420, 
1424 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that witness tampering prosecutions can be brought under §§ 
1503 or 1512). 
 Some circuits consider the 1988 amendment to the Act to conclusively establish that 
witness tampering should no longer be prosecuted under the omnibus clause of § 1503, but 
solely under § 1512.  See United States v. Masterpol, 940 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1991).  See also 
Haney, supra note 39, at 66 (discussing that while Congressional intent seems to be that 
§ 1512 provides the exclusive mechanism for prosecuting a defendant for witness 
tampering, some courts continue to allow witness tampering prosecutions under § 1503).  
However, the majority of courts hold “that § 1512 is not the exclusive vehicle for 
prosecution for witness tampering.”  Moody,  977 F.2d at 1424. 
51  United States v. Khatami, 280 F.3d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that by its terms, 
the Act prohibited those acts specifically listed); King, 762 F.2d 232 (holding that § 1512 
reaches only conduct enumerated within the Act).  See generally McLaughlin & Nahum, 
supra note 28, at 814. 
52 Khatami, 280 F.3d at 912; King, 762 F.2d at 237.  See also McLaughlin & Nahum, supra 
note 28, at 814. 
53 See infra Part II.C (discussing the intent and jurisdictional elements of § 1512). 
54 Surette, supra note 32, at 14.  One of the first major cases to address a specific element 
of § 1512 addressed the intent element of the Act.  See United States v. Scaife, 749 F.2d 338, 
348 (6th Cir. 1984).  See also United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347 (8th Cir. 1988).  Later 
cases began to interpret the language of the statute which required that the witness or 
victim communicate with a law enforcement officer.  See United States v. Edwards, 36 F.3d 
639, 645 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909, 917 (3d Cir. 1996); United 
States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345, 1349 (3d Cir. 1997). 
55 See Scaife, 749 F.2d at 348 (discussing the intent element of § 1512); Stansfield, 101 F.3d 
at 918 (discussing the requirement that the government prove the defendant believed his 
conduct would prevent communication with a federal officer); Bell, 113 F.3d 1345 
(clarifying the decision in Stansfield). 
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a proceeding or investigation.56  Second, the government must establish 
that the proceeding or investigation with which the defendant intended 
to interfere was federal in nature.57  The intent element has been 
addressed by the United States Supreme Court.58  However, the 
language of the jurisdictional element remains debated among the 
Circuits as indicated by the recent decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in United States v. Harris.59  First, Part II.C.1 discusses the intent 
element of the Act.60  Parts II.C.2 and II.C.3 then discuss the federal 
nexus requirement.61  Finally, Part II.C.3 discusses the current split 
regarding the nexus requirement.62 
1. Arthur Andersen—Settling Intent, but Leaving Open Federal Nexus 
Although different subsections of § 1512 proscribe different conduct, 
the element of intent is analyzed in the same manner for each.63  Under 
                                                 
56 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2006).  See also Scaife, 749 F.2d at 348; Surette, supra note 32, at 14; and 
McLaughlin & Nahum, supra note 28, at 814. 
57 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2006).  See also Surette, supra note 32, at 14; and McLaughlin & 
Nahum, supra note 28, at 814.  Section 1512 has many subsections which proscribe different 
conduct, but the analysis regarding whether the proceeding or investigation is federal in 
nature applies in equal force to all subsections.  United States v. Baldyga, 233 F.3d 674, 680 
n.5 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Diaz, 176 F3d 52, 91 (2d Cir. 1999); Veal, 153 F.3d at 1245. 
58 See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005). 
59 Kearney, supra note 2.  See also United States v. Harris, 498 F.3d 278, 286–87 (4th Cir. 
2007) (holding that the government can establish a sufficient federal nexus by establishing 
that the communication relates to the commission or possible commission of a federal 
offense); United States v. Causey, 185 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. 1999) ; Veal, 153 F.3d at 1251 
(holding that the government can establish a sufficient federal nexus by establishing the 
information provide by a witness related to a possible federal offense and the possibility 
existed that the information would be transferred to federal authorities).  See infra generally 
Part II.D. 
60 See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Arthur Andersen 
defining the intent element of § 1512). 
61 See infra Parts II.C.2–3 (discussing the federal nexus requirement of § 1512). 
62 See infra Part II.C.4 (discussing the current circuit split regarding what constitutes a 
proper federal nexus for purposes of § 1512). 
63 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2006).  In order for the government to prosecute a defendant for any 
conduct proscribed under § 1512, it must establish that the defendant acted with the intent 
to interfere with or influence a person’s involvement in an investigation or official 
proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2006).  See also McLaughlin & Nahum, supra note 28, at 818; 
supra note 58 (discussing that the analysis regarding the federal nexus is the same for all 
subsections).  Because the intent elements are analyzed in the same general manner for all 
subsections of § 1512, this Note will focus on the subsection used most often to prosecute 
under this section, § 1512(b).  Section 1512(b) states that a defendant must “knowingly” 
perform any of the specified conduct enumerated in the section with the intent to influence, 
interfere with or obstruct an investigation or official proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2006).  
See also supra note 41 (citing relevant parts of § 1512(b)).  While the courts have addressed 
what constitutes “corrupt persuasion,” “misleading conduct,” and other such conduct that 
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the Act, the government must establish that the defendant acted 
knowingly to commit conduct enumerated within the Act.64  In 2005, the 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Arthur Andersen LLP v. 
United States to specifically decide the knowledge requirement under 
§ 1512.65 
In that case, the defendant instructed its employees to destroy 
documents according to its corporate document retention policy both 
prior to and after the Security Exchange Commission (“SEC”) opened an 
official investigation into the financial condition of one of the 
defendant’s major clients.66  The government brought an indictment 
                                                                                                             
falls within the purview of the Act, the courts’ analysis as to the definition and scope of 
such conduct is beyond the scope of this Note. 
64 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2006).  See Guadalupe, 402 F.3d 409; Khatami, 280 F.3d at 912; King, 
762 F.2d 232.  See also McLaughlin & Nahum, supra note 28, at 813. 
65 Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. 696.  At issue in the case was whether the instructions 
given to the jury adequately conveyed the elements required under the Act to convict the 
defendant of knowingly using intimidation to corruptly persuade witnesses with the intent 
to tamper with a federal proceeding.  Id. at 698.  Specifically, the Court considered the 
requisite intent under § 1512 and held that a person could not be found to have acted 
“knowingly” if he lacked awareness of any wrongdoing on his part.  Id. at 706.  In Arthur 
Andersen, the court’s analysis focused on the requisite intent needed to show a defendant 
acted knowingly to interfere with a proceeding. Id. at 706.  The defendant was convicted of 
corruptly persuading employees to tamper with evidence under § 1512(b)(2) of the VWPA 
when the company’s auditors instructed its employees to destroy documents according to 
company policy.  Id.  The Court remanded the case because it found that the jury 
instructions failed to instruct the jury to find specifically that the auditors acted with 
knowledge that the destruction of the documents would corruptly interfere with a 
proceeding. Id. Thus, in order to convict a defendant under § 1512, the government must 
establish that the defendant knowingly acted to interfere with an investigation or 
proceeding. Id.  See generally Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, Definition of Securities 
and Exempt Offerings, 3 SEC. & FED. CORP. L. § 1:188 (2d ed. 2007) (discussing the factual 
background of Arthur Andersen and the trial judge’s handling of the case); John Hasnas, The 
Significant Meaninglessness of Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 
187 (2005) (discussing the factual background and effect of the Court’s decision in Arthur 
Andersen); O’Sullivan, supra note 46, at 694-96 (discussing the factual and procedural 
background of Arthur Andersen). 
66 Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 701–02.  The defendant, Arthur Andersen provided 
auditing services to the Enron Corporation, a major energy conglomerate.  Id. at 699.  After 
Enron’s financial performance began to decline, the public became aware of possible 
improprieties within the corporation.  Id.  In anticipation of future litigation, Enron retained 
outside counsel to represent the corporation in any possible litigation.  Id.  After the SEC 
notified Enron that it would most likely investigate any improprieties, the defendant 
instructed its employees at a general training meeting and in subsequent e-mails and 
notifications to conform to Enron’s document retention policy.  Id. at 701.  The SEC opened 
an official investigation into the matter one week after the final notification to Enron’s 
employees. Id. at 702.  However, document destruction continued for an additional week 
until the SEC subpoenaed the documents.  Id. at 699.   
 The Enron scandal was not Arthur Andersen’s only debacle during the time period 
preceding the SEC investigation.  Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited:  
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against the defendant for tampering with witnesses.  A jury found 
Arthur Andersen guilty of tampering with witnesses by corruptly 
persuading them to alter, destroy, or withhold documents needed in an 
official proceeding under the Act.67  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed, holding that the jury did not need to find any “conscious 
wrongdoing” in order to convict the defendant under the Act.68 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the 
meaning of “knowingly” within § 1512.69  The Court noted that it 
                                                                                                             
Lessons of the Arthur Andersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107 (2006) (discussing 
Arthur Andersen’s downfall and the resulting repercussions).  See also Jonathon M. 
Redgrave, R. Christopher Cook & Charles R. Ragan, Looking Beyond Arthur Andersen:  The 
Impact on Corporate Records and Information Management Policies and Practices, 52 FED. LAW. 
32, 33 (2005) (discussing Arthur Andersen’s involvement in other scandals and the facts 
leading up to the SEC investigation into Enron).  Several other cases arose from Arthur 
Andersen’s accounting and auditing services of other large corporations, such as Waste 
Management Corporation and Sunbeam Corporation.  Ainslie, supra, at 107. 
67 Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 699.  Specifically, the federal government charged 
defendant under §§ 1512(b)(2)(A) and (B).  Id. at 698.  These sections of the Act proscribe 
anyone from intimidating, threatening or corruptly persuading another person to withhold 
records or “alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object. . . for use in an official 
proceeding[.]”  18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(B) (2006).  In order to reach its decision, the jury 
required additional instructions from the judge clarifying the requisite elements under the 
Act.  Bloomenthal & Wolff, supra note 65.  Post-verdict interviews indicate that the jurors’ 
findings may have been faulty and confused despite these further instructions.  Id. 
68 Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 698.  Specifically, the jury found the defendant guilty 
of violating § 1512(b)(2)(A) which prohibits tampering with documents that a witness may 
provide to authorities for use in official proceedings.  Id.  Currently, in factual 
circumstances such as those in Arthur Andersen, the government would most likely bring 
the action under § 1512(c)(1) because Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act shortly 
after the decision to amend § 1512(c) in order to address specifically corrupt document 
destruction.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 800 (2002) 
(amending § 1512(c)(1)).  The Amendment proscribes alteration, destruction, mutilation or 
concealment of documents or objects.  Id.  See also supra note 41 (citing the current language 
of the statute).  In addition to broadening the scope of § 1512(c), the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
made, among other things, falsification of documents meant to be used in federal 
investigations a crime.  18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2006).  See also Albert D. Spalding, Jr. & Mary 
Ashby Morrison, Criminal Liability for Document Shredding after Arthur Andersen LLP,  43 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 647, 648 (2006). 
69 Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 702.  A split developed in the circuits regarding the 
requisite intent needed to show that a defendant acted knowingly to corruptly persuade a 
witness.  United States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 1301 (11th Cir. 1998) (discussing several 
circuits’ interpretation of the intent element of § 1512(b)); Khatami, 280 F.3d at 913 
(discussing the differing interpretations § 1512(b)).  The Second and Eleventh Circuits 
Courts of Appeals interpreted “‘corruptly persuade’” to encompass conduct meant to 
persuade out of motivation for an improper purpose.  Shotts, 145 F.3d at 1301; United States 
v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442 (2d Cir. 1996).  However, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
expressly rejected this definition and held that a defendant must do more than attempt to 
discourage a witness’ participation in an official proceeding. United States v. Farrell, 126 
F.3d 484, 489–490 (3d Cir. 1997).  While the court specifically addressed the meaning of 
“knowingly . . . corruptly persuade[][,]” Arthur Andersen has been cited to repeatedly in 
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generally exercises restraint in interpreting a federal criminal statute for 
two reasons:  (1) the prerogatives of Congress deserve due deference 
from the judiciary, and (2) individuals deserve fair warning of whether 
certain conduct is punishable under the law.70  Therefore, the Court 
limited its interpretation to the plain language of the statute and found 
that “knowingly” implies “awareness, understanding, or 
consciousness.”71  Thus, the Court held that, in order for a conviction 
under § 1512, the government must establish a person was conscious of 
wrongdoing when he acted to affect a proceeding or investigation.72  
Although the Court in Arthur Andersen specifically addressed the 
requirement that a defendant consciously act to interfere with an official 
proceeding, the Court only briefly addressed what was needed to satisfy 
the jurisdictional requirement of the Act.73  The Court held that, in order 
                                                                                                             
later cases to elucidate more generally the meaning of “knowingly[.]” See United States v. 
Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 176 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Arthur Andersen to hold that “§ 1512(b) 
requires proof of a mental state that is knowingly corrupt with respect to the action 
taken”); Harris, 498 F.3d at 288–89 (citing Arthur Andersen to note that § 1512(b) requires 
that the government show that the defendant acted with some knowledge that his actions 
would interfere with an official proceeding).  However, courts have not extended Arthur 
Andersen to negate § 1512(g), which states that the government need not prove state of 
mind with regard to the federal nature of official proceeding or the judge of law 
enforcement officer.  Id. at 288. 
70 Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 703.  The court went on to explain that persuasion by 
itself can manifest itself in many innocuous situations, such as a mother persuading her 
child to keep confidences or an attorney persuading his client not to turn over documents 
that fall within attorney-client privilege. Id. at 704. 
71 Id. at 705.  The Court stated that it “traditionally [has] exercised restraint in assessing 
the reach of a federal criminal statute, both out of deference to the prerogatives of Congress 
. . . and out of concern that ‘a fair warning should be given to the world in language that 
the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is 
passed[.]’” Id. at 703 (citing United States v. Dowling, 473 U.S. 207 (1985) and United States 
v. McBoyle, 515 U.S. 593 (1931)).  The Court analyzed the language within the Act and 
concluded that “corruptly” is “normally associated with wrongful, immoral, depraved, or 
evil.” Id. at 705.  Thus, the Court concluded that persons must be conscious of wrongdoing 
to have the required culpability under § 1512(b).  Id. 
72 Id.  The Court remanded the case for further findings on whether the defendant acted 
with knowledge that advising employees to comply with company document retention 
programs would wrongly interfere with a future official proceeding.  Id.  Specifically, the 
Supreme Court held that the jury instructions did not adequately state the mens rea 
required under the statute.  Bloomenthal & Wolff, supra note 65.  On remand, a court 
sentenced Arthur Andersen to five years probation and fined the firm $500,000.  Ainslie, 
supra note 66.  Also, the firm agreed to cease operation of its public auditing companies 
which in effect ended all business for Arthur Andersen.  Id.  As a result of the cessation of 
business, 28,000 of the firm’s employees were left unemployed.  Id. 
73 Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 707–08.  The Court’s main finding was that the jury 
instructions improperly defined the requisite intent required under the Act.  Id. at 706.  
However, the Court also found the jury instructions infirm because the instructions did not 
instruct the jury to find any relationship between the federal investigation and the 
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to establish a federal nexus, the government must show both a defendant 
could foresee that his actions were likely to obstruct federal proceedings 
and the defendant acted with the intent to do so.74  However, the Court 
did not enunciate a test that would determine exactly what constituted a 
federal nexus in order to bring the defendant under § 1512 of the 
VWPA.75 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Arthur Andersen, a 
disagreement among the circuits developed regarding what constituted 
a sufficient nexus to bring a defendant under the jurisdiction of the 
VWPA.76  However, the specific issue in Arthur Andersen did not concern 
this nexus requirement; therefore, the Court held only that some nexus 
was required in order for a defendant to be convicted under the federal 
statute.77  In contrast, in United States v. Aguilar, the Supreme Court 
addressed the nexus requirement of a similar statute.78 
                                                                                                             
defendant’s destruction of the documents.  Id. at 707.  The Court found that the jury 
instructions improperly led the jury to conclude that it was not required to find any nexus 
between the persuasion to destroy documents and any proceeding and held that a nexus 
must be found to exist between the act to influence testimony and a particular official 
proceeding.  Id. 
74 Id. at 707–08 (stating that “[i]t is . . . one thing to say that a proceeding ‘need not be 
pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense,’ and quite another to say a 
proceeding need not even be foreseen.”). 
75 Id. at 708.  When discussing the federal nexus requirement, the Court referred to its 
decision interpreting the nexus requirement of § 1503.  Id. (citing to Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 ).  
The Court in Arthur Andersen stated that with regard to § 1503, the statute “required 
something more—specifically, a nexus between the obstructive act and the proceeding.”  
Id. Thus, the Court would also require that the government establish that some ‘nexus’ 
exists between a defendant’s conduct and a federal investigation or proceeding in 
prosecutions under § 1512.  Id.  
76 United States v. Perry, 335 F.3d 316, 321 n.7 (4th Cir. 2003).  The Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in Perry noted that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Veal had 
established a nexus requirement which deviated from the test enunciated in other circuits.  
Id.  See also United States v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679 (3d Circ. 1999); Veal, 153 F.3d 1233; 
United States v. Causey, 185 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. 1999); Bell, 113 F.3d 1345; United States v. 
Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Edwards, 36 F.3d 639 (7th Cir. 1994). 
77 Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 708.  The Court held that “‘if the defendant lacks 
knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding’ . . . ‘he lacks the 
requisite intent to obstruct.’”  Id.  The Court’s focus in the case rested on the meaning of 
“knowingly . . . corruptly persuade[][.]”  See supra note 69 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Court’s analysis of the intent element). 
78 515 U.S. 593 (1995).  See discussion infra Part II.C.2. 
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2. United States v. Aguilar:  Federal Nexus Under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 
The United States Supreme Court addressed the federal nexus 
requirement of the omnibus clause of § 1503 in United States v. Aguilar.79  
During an interview conducted prior to the commencement of grand 
jury proceedings against an individual suspected of embezzling funds 
from a union, Judge Robert P. Aguilar lied to Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (“FBI”) agents about his involvement in the crime.80  Later, 
after trial and appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the 
Ninth Circuit’s reversal of Judge Aguilar’s conviction of obstruction of 
justice.81 
The Supreme Court reasoned that a defendant must act with the 
intent to influence grand jury or judicial proceedings and not simply to 
                                                 
79 Id.  In that case, a jury convicted Judge Robert P. Aguilar of illegally disclosing a 
wiretap under 18 U.S.C. § 2232(c) and of obstruction of justice under § 1503.  Id. at 595.  The 
Ninth Circuit reversed both convictions because it found neither statute proscribed his 
conduct. United States v. Aguilar, 21 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1994), rev’d in part, aff’d in part, 515 
U.S. 593 (1995).  The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the decision of the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the § 2232(c) conviction and affirmed the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s reversal of Judge Aguilar’s conviction under § 1503.  
Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 596.  
 The Court granted certiorari to specifically address the issues of “whether § 1503 
punishes false statements made to potential grand jury witnesses[]” and to answer a 
question regarding another federal statute.  Id. at 595.  The Court found that § 1503 
protected only those persons listed in the statute, grand or petit jurors or officers of federal 
courts.  Id.  While discussing who constituted a person protected under § 1503, the Court 
also addressed the scope of conduct prohibited under the statute.  Id. at 599. 
80 Id. at 597.  The timing of the interview proved to be the decisive factor for the United 
States Supreme Court.  Id. at 599.  The Court held that a defendant could not be convicted 
under § 1503 for obstructing an ancillary proceeding to a grand jury proceeding because § 
1503 protects only witnesses and grand or petit jurors in pending proceedings and not 
possible witnesses or jurors who might testify in a future proceeding.  Id. at 601.  
Conversely, an FBI agent is merely an investigatory official of the government, and FBI 
investigations are not judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings as defined by § 1503.  Id.  Thus, 
the interview conducted by the FBI to the commencement of any such proceedings did not 
fall within the protection of § 1503.  Id.  See also CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO WHITE-
COLLAR CRIME § 1:32 (2007) (discussing the findings and holding of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Aguilar); James K. Fitzpatrick, The Supreme Court’s Bipolar Approach to the 
Interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 and 18 U.S.C. § 2232(c),  86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1383, 
1383–84 (1996) (discussing the facts and procedural history of Aguilar); O’Sullivan, supra 
note 45, at 691–93 (discussing the facts and rationale of the Court in Aguilar). 
81 Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 597.  A jury convicted Aguilar of “endeavoring to obstruct the due 
administration of justice in violation of § 1503.”  Id. at 595.  The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed the conviction on a hearing en banc, holding that the statutory language 
of § 1503 did not cover Aguilar’s conduct in the FBI interview because Aguilar had not 
interfered with a pending proceeding.  Id.  In finding § 1503 inapplicable in the situation, 
the Court noted that the FBI had not been authorized by a grand jury to conduct the 
interview.  Id. 
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affect an ancillary proceeding independent of the court’s or grand jury’s 
authority.82  The Court also held that a defendant must act with the 
knowledge that his conduct will have the “natural and probable” effect 
of interfering with a grand jury or judicial proceeding.83  Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, and Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part in the 
decision, finding that the omnibus clause of § 1503 extended to ancillary 
proceedings because the clause makes “endeavor[ing]” to interfere with 
                                                 
82 Id. at 599 (stating that the actions of “the accused must be with an intent to influence 
judicial or grand jury proceedings[]”).  The Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the 
Ninth Circuit of Appeals that an interview conducted before the commencement of grand 
jury proceedings is ancillary to those proceedings and does not fall within the protection of 
§ 1503. Id. at 597.  Also, the Court found that the government’s assertions were too 
speculative to support a conviction because the agent to whom Judge Aguilar lied to had 
not been subpoenaed nor was there any indication he would be.  Id. at 601.  See also David 
D. Jividen, Charging Post-Offense Obstructive Actions, A.F.L REV. 113 (1996) (discussing 
obstruction of justice within the military justice system).  However, a later opinion of the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals questions whether the statute’s text requires a finding that 
a proceeding is pending.  United States v. Novak, 217 F.3d 566 (8th Cir. 2000).  See also 
O’Sullivan, supra note 45, at 687. 
83 Aguilar, 515 U.S at 601 (stating that the defendant must act with the knowledge that 
his conduct will “have the ‘natural and probable effect’ of interfering with the due 
administration of justice.”).  Thus, the Court interpreted an endeavor to influence as 
anything that has “‘the natural and probable effect’ of interfering with the due 
administration of justice.”  Id.  See also Mark Mermelsetin & Charlotte Decker, Walk the Line:  
Attorneys Will Find Statutory Language of Limited Use in Determining What Constitutes 
Obstruction of Justice, LOS ANGELES LAW., Dec. 2006, at 27, 30 (discussing the implications of 
the Court’s decision in Aguilar to practicing attorneys). However, the Court clarified that 
the defendant could still be convicted under § 1503 even though the subpoenaed witness 
was ultimately not called to testify, as long as the defendant acted with the intent to 
influence the proceedings.  Aguilar, 515 U.S at 602.  The example given by the Court was 
that: 
Were a defendant with the requisite intent to lie to a subpoenaed 
witness who is ultimately not called to testify, or who testifies but does 
not transmit the defendant’s version of the story, the defendant has 
endeavored to obstruct, but has not actually obstructed, justice.  Under 
our approach, a jury could find such defendant guilty. 
Id. 
 The Court’s decision to enunciate a nexus requirement for § 1503 has met some 
criticism.  See Fitzpatrick, supra note 80, at 1383-84; O’Sullivan, supra note 45, at 687.  
Commentators argue that the plain language of the statute and prior case law adequately 
support the Court’s holding in Aguilar without requiring the Court to establish the natural 
and probable effect test set forth in the decision.  Id.  Also, they argue that legislative 
history of the statute shows that Congress did not intend the statute to be construed as 
narrowly as the Court read it in Aguilar.  Fitzpatrick, supra note 80, at 1403.  These 
arguments find some support in Justice Scalia’s dissent in the case, in which he criticizes 
the majority’s distortion of the natural and probable effects test set forth in a prior decision 
interpreting the predecessor statute to § 1503.  Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 611 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
Kennedy, J., and Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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the due administration of justice a crime.84  Thus, according to Justice 
Scalia, any act the defendant commits with the intent to obstruct a 
proceeding is sufficient to establish a sufficient nexus under § 1503.85  
While Aguilar has been cited several times in reference to § 1512, 
courts cite Aguilar only to elucidate the fact that a nexus must be shown 
between a statutorily forbidden act and a federal proceeding.86  Section 
1503 protection extends only to grand jury members and court officials; 
on the other hand, § 1512 extends to any person who might participate in 
an investigation or proceeding.87  Because different jurisdictional 
                                                 
84 Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., and Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  While the dissent did argue that § 1503 did extend to ancillary 
proceedings, they did note that the clause is not unlimited, because the government is 
required to prove that the defendant acted with the purpose to interfere.  Id. at 611 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting).  The dissent states that § 1503 is limited by its own language because it only 
reaches “purposeful efforts to obstruct the due administration of justice, i.e., acts performed 
with that very object in mind.”  Id.  (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).  The 
dissent noted that specific intent to obstruct justice could be shown where the defendant 
intentionally committed a “wrongful act that had obstruction of justice as its ‘natural and 
probable consequence.’”  Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).   See also Fitzpatrick, supra note 80, at 
1399 (discussing Justice Scalia’s interpretation of § 1503).  Thus, Scalia argued that Judge 
Aguilar’s actions did violate the Omnibus Clause of § 1503, and the jury properly convicted 
him of obstruction of justice under the statute. Id. 
 Regarding the dissent’s disposition on the rest of the issues in the case, the three 
Justices concurred in the holding regarding violations of other statutes but disagreed with 
the majority’s affirmation of the Ninth Circuit’s reversal of the § 1503 conviction.  Id. at 609 
(Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   Justice 
Stevens concurred in the Court’s disposition of § 15103 but dissented regarding the 
defendant’s conviction under another statute.  Id. at 607 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
85 Id. at 613 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that “an act committed with the intent to 
obstruct is all that matters[]”) (emphasis in original).  See also Fitzpatrick, supra note 80, at 
1402 (stating that Congress did not intend the Omnibus Clause of § 1503 to be narrowly 
construed). 
86 See Harris, 498 F.3d at 286 (citing Aguilar to hold that “[s]o long as the information the 
defendant seeks to suppress actually relates to the commission or possible commission of a 
federal offense, the federal nexus requirement is established.”). 
87 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2006).  The relevant part of § 1503 states: 
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter 
or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any 
grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States, or officer 
who may be serving at any examination or other proceeding before 
any United States magistrate judge or other committing magistrate, in 
the discharge of his duty, or injures any such grand or petit juror in his 
person or property on account of any verdict or indictment assented to 
by him, or on account of his being or having been such juror, or injures 
any such officer, magistrate judge, or other committing magistrate in his 
person or property on account of the performance of his official duties 
. . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (2006) (emphasis added).  See also supra note 46 (contrasting the current 
statute with its predecessor).  Protection under § 1512 extends to “any person” who may 
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prerequisites are required under each separate section, lower courts find 
Aguilar persuasive but do not find it controlling with regard to 
§ 1512(g)’s jurisdictional element.88 
The Supreme Court has held and circuit courts agree that a federal 
nexus must exist before a defendant may be prosecuted under § 1512 of 
the VWPA, but the circuit courts disagree as to what satisfies this 
requirement with regard to § 1512.89  Several courts have interpreted 
§ 1512 to require that a victim communicate directly to a federal officer.90  
However, other courts require only that the acts reported by a witness 
constitute a federal crime and that a possibility exists that the witness’ 
information would be transferred to a federal officer.91 
                                                                                                             
communicate to a federal officer regarding a federal offense regardless of the conduct used 
to intimidate.  18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2006).  Under § 1512(a)(1), a defendant is prohibited from 
killing or attempting to kill another person with the intent to “prevent the attendance or 
testimony of any person in an official proceeding[.]”  18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A) (2006) 
(emphasis added).  Also, the statute prohibits an individual from using “physical force or 
the threat of physical force against any person, or attempts to do so, with the intent to . . . 
influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding[.]”  18 
U.S.C. § 1512(a)(2)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).  Finally, § 1512(b) prohibits an individual 
from knowingly intimidating, threatening “another person[]” with the intent to “influence, 
delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding[.]” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1512(b)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
88 Veal, 153 F.3d at 1249 (stating that the numerous obstruction of justice statutes 
“contain distinct jurisdictional prerequisites necessary for invoking federal authority to 
prosecute specific conduct.”).  The Eleventh Circuit, in Veal, held that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Aguilar was controlling because § 1503 implicates the “government’s interest in 
preserving the integrity of a judicial proceeding[,]” while § 1512(b) implicates other 
government interest outside a federal judicial proceeding.  Id. at 1250.  But see United States 
v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 176 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that “the evidence that was sufficient 
to establish the nexus element for the section 1503 charge applies with equal force to 
establishing that element of the witness tampering charge” and that “Aguilar’s nexus 
requirement applies to some degree to section 1512(b)[]”). 
89 Kearney, supra note 2.  See also Guadalupe, 402 F.3d 409 (discussing the disagreement 
between the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits); Veal, 153 F.3d 1233 (extending the reach of § 
1512); Causey, 185 F.3d 407 (refusing to apply the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals). 
90 See Bell, 113 F.3d 1345 (finding a sufficient nexus because the witness communicated 
with members of a joint federal and state investigation); Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909  (finding a 
sufficient nexus because the defendant attacked the witness six months after federal 
officials took over the investigation); Scaife, 749 F.2d 338 (finding a nexus because the 
informants communicated directly with federal authorities).  See also discussion infra Parts 
II.C.3 (discussing the Scaife decision); Part II.D (discussing the Bell and Stansfield decisions). 
91 See Harris, 498 F.3d 278 (finding a sufficient nexus because local officials later turned 
the investigation over to federal authorities); Guadalupe, 402 F.3d 409 (finding a federal 
nexus when the initial investigators later reported the witness’ testimony to federal 
officials); United States v. Baldyga, 233 F.3d 674 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding a sufficient nexus 
where federal officials joined an investigation initially begun by local and state authorities); 
and Veal, 153 F.3d 1233 (finding a sufficient federal nexus when the witness communicated 
to local authorities who later relayed this communication to federal authorities). 
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3. Knowledge of the Federal Nature of the Proceeding Not Required 
Several courts have adjudicated the question of what is sufficient to 
provide jurisdiction under § 1512 of the VWPA.92  Courts often refer to 
two subsections of § 1512 when analyzing whether a defendant’s 
conduct falls within the purview of the Act.93  According to the Act, the 
government does not have to establish that, at the time the defendant 
acted to interfere with the statute, an official proceeding was pending or 
about to be instituted.94  Also, the government does not have to establish 
that the defendant possessed knowledge that the proceeding or 
investigation he meant to interfere with was federal in nature.95  Early 
cases discussing whether the government must establish that a 
defendant knew the proceeding was federal in nature at the time he 
acted to interfere with a proceeding usually involved defendants who 
acted to interfere with investigations or proceedings that were in fact 
federal.96  The main case illustrating this and interpreting the knowledge 
requirement under § 1512 is United States v. Scaife.97  
                                                 
92 See, e.g., Harris, 498 F.3d 278 ; Perry, 335 F.3d 316; Veal, 153 F.3d 1233; Causey, 185 F.3d 
407; Bell, 113 F.3d 1345; Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909.  See generally McLaughlin & Nahum, supra 
note 28, at 817; Surette, supra note 32, at 48–66; Brendan Kearney, supra note 2.  See also supra 
Part II.D (discussing the current circuit split). 
93 18 U.S.C §§ 1512(f) and (g) (2006).  Section 1512(f) states that “[f]or purposes of this 
section . . . an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time 
of the offense[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1) (2006).  Section 1512(g) states that: 
In a prosecution for an offense under this section, no state of mind 
need be proved with respect to the circumstance— 
(1) that the official proceeding before a judge, court, magistrate judge, 
grand jury, or government agency is before a judge or court of the 
United States, a United States magistrate judge, a bankruptcy judge, a 
Federal grand jury, or a Federal Government agency; or 
(2) that the judge is a judge of the United States or that the law 
enforcement officer is an officer or employee of the Federal 
Government or a person authorized to act for or on behalf of the 
Federal Government or  serving the Federal Government as an adviser 
or consultant. 
18 U.S.C. § 1512(g) (2006). 
94 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 110-317 (excluding P.L. 110-234, 
110-246, and 110-315) approved Aug. 29, 2008).  The statute specifically reads: “For the 
purposes of this section . . . an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be 
instituted at the time of the offense[.]”  Id.  See generally Surette, supra note 32 (discussing 
the construction and application of the Act). 
95 See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(g).  See generally Surette, supra note 32 (discussing the elements of 
§ 1512). 
96 See Scaife, 749 F.2d 338.  See also Davis, 932 F.2d at 761 (stating that government need 
not prove the defendant knew the proceeding he was tampering with was federal); United 
States v. Gonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044, 1054 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that the government is not 
required to prove “defendant’s state of mind with respect to the elements of the federal 
nature of the proceeding, the judge, agency, or law enforcement officer.”); United States v. 
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In Scaife, FBI informants assisted officials in a federal investigation 
that eventually led to the defendants’ arrests.98  After these arrests, the 
defendants conspired to kill the informants and two co-defendants who 
had agreed to testify against them in order to prevent the informants and 
co-defendants from testifying at their trial.99  The defendants were 
subsequently convicted of witness tampering under § 1512, and on 
appeal argued that the conviction was improper because the government 
did not establish that the defendants knew the informants would testify 
before a grand jury nor did the government prove that grand jury 
proceedings were pending at the time of the attempted interference.100  
However, the court held that the plain language of the Act did not 
require the government to prove that the defendant knew a federal 
grand jury or federal law enforcement officers were involved because the 
Act does not require the government to show that a defendant was 
                                                                                                             
Kelley, 36 F.3d 1118, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that the Act “does not require explicit 
proof . . . that such  proceedings were pending or were about to be instituted[]” at the time 
the defendant acted to obstruct the proceedings).  “The analysis regarding the federal 
character of the crime and the relevant authorities applies with equal force to any 
consideration of a conviction under § 1512.”  United States v. Baldyga, 233 F.3d 674, 680 n.5 
(1st Cir. 2000) (citing to United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 91 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
97 Scaife, 749 F.2d 338.  A jury convicted both defendants of conspiring to violate the 
Hobbs Act, aiding and abetting the use and possession of a firearm during the commission 
of a felony, and witness tampering.  Id. at 341.  Both defendants argued for reversal based 
on a multitude of arguments, including violation of the Speedy Trial Act and misjoinder.  
Id. at 343–44.  These additional arguments are outside the scope of this Note. 
98 Id. at 341.  Defendants recruited two co-conspirators from a previous robbery, but 
who had since become FBI informants. Id. at 341.  The FBI monitored the group’s conduct 
and recorded conversations setting forth the plan to rob an Arkansas general store and fur 
store for three days leading up to the night of the planned robbery.  Id. at 341–42.  The FBI 
arrested the conspirators as they assembled to accomplish the plan.  Id. at 342. 
99 Id.  Two of the codefendants eventually pled guilty after their arrest and agreed to 
testify against the two defendants.  Id.  After learning of this, one of the defendants 
contacted Hosea Moore to ask for help in a plan to kill the two codefendants.  Id.  Moore 
then contacted the FBI and cooperated with officials in the investigation leading to the 
defendant’s arrest and conviction of witness tampering under the Act.  Id. 
100 Id. at 348.  The defendants argued that § 1512 required that the government prove 
both that the defendants were aware that the informants planned to testify at trial and that 
the grand jury proceedings had begun prior to the attempted interference.  Id.  Defendants 
also tried to argue that the government never established proper venue for the witness 
tampering charge.  Id. at 346.  However, the court held that the government proved proper 
venue because the grand jury proceeding with which the defendants wished to interfere 
was located in the district in which the court sat.  Id.  See also Peter Schleck & Gregory S. 
Wright, Interference with the Judicial Process, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 789, 805 (1993) (discussing 
proper venue in § 1512 prosecutions).  Courts initially differed on whether this construction 
of the statute was proper until Congress amended § 1512.  Id.  Section 1512(i) clarifies that 
venue is proper “in the district in which the official proceeding (whether or not pending or 
about to be instituted) was intended to be affected or in the district in which the conduct 
constituting the alleged offense occurred.”  Id. at 806 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1512(h)). 
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subjectively aware that the proceeding or investigation, with which he 
acted to interfere, was federal in nature.101  The rule established in 
Scaife has generally been adopted by all jurisdictions.102  The government 
need only establish that a defendant acted with the belief that his 
conduct would interfere with an investigation or proceeding.103  
However, a circuit split currently exists regarding the precise level of 
federal involvement in the investigation or proceeding to establish a 
sufficient federal nexus.104 
                                                 
101 Scaife, 749 F.2d at 348.  See also 18 U.S.C. § 1512(d) (2006).  The court stated that it was 
obvious from the facts that the defendant intended to use intimidation or force against the 
informant in order to prevent the informant from giving information to any official 
regarding the underlying offense.  Scaife, 749 F.2d at 348.   Under the plain language of 
§ 1512(d), the government did not need to establish that the officials involved were, in fact, 
federal officials.  Id.  But see Christopher R. Chase, To Shred or Not to Shred: Document 
Retention Policies and Federal Obstruction of Justice Statutes, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 721, 
740–41 (2003) (stating that the Fifth Circuit requires some circumstantial proof of a 
defendant’s intent to influence testimony in a pending federal proceeding).  The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Shively, explained that “Scaife does not obviate 
every facet of the government’s obligation to prove intent under § 1512.”  927 F.2d 804, 812 
(5th Cir. 1991).  The Fifth Circuit requires “at least a circumstantial showing of [an] intent to 
affect testimony at some particular federal proceeding . . . .” in order for the conduct to be 
proscribed under the Act.  Id. (emphasis added).  However, the court acknowledged that 
§ 1512 does not require the government to prove that the proceeding is pending or about to 
be instituted. Id. at 812.  See also Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen’s Fall from Grace, 81 WASH U. 
L.Q. 917, 932 n.79 (2003). 
102 See, e.g., United States v. Kelley, 36 F.3d 1118, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing to Scaife in 
stating that the Act “does not require explicit proof . . . that such proceedings were pending 
or were about to be instituted[]” at the time the defendant acted to obstruct the 
proceedings” ); United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 761 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing to Scaife in 
stating that the government need not prove “the defendant knew he was tampering with a 
federal proceeding[]”); United States v. Gonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing to 
Scaife in stating that the government is not required to prove “defendant’s state of mind 
with respect to the elements of the federal nature of the proceeding, the judge, agency, or 
law enforcement officer.”).  See generally McLaughlin & Nahum, supra note 28, at 817; 
Surette, supra note 32, at 15–16.  Even the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Shively recognizes that a defendant need not be aware that a particular proceeding is 
federal, as long as the proceeding is in fact federal.  Shively, 927 F.2d at 812. 
103 United States v. Romero, 54 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Leisure, 844 
F.2d 1347, 1364 (8th Cir. 1988)) (stating that the government need only establish that a 
defendant acted with intent to prevent potential witnesses from giving information to 
federal officials); United States v. Edwards, 36 F.3d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that “the 
presence of an investigation or judicial proceedings is immaterial as long as there is 
evidence that the defendant believed that a person might furnish information to federal 
officials and that he killed or attempted to kill that person in order to prevent such 
disclosure[]”) (citing Leisure, 844 F.2d at 1364 ) (emphasis in original) abrogated on other 
grounds by U.S. v. Monroe 73 F.3d 129 (7th Cir. 1995). 
104 See, e.g. Harris,498 F.3d 278; Guadalupe, 402 F.3d 409; Perry, 335 F.3d 316; Applewhaite, 
195 F.3d 679; United States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345; Causey, 185 F.3d 407; Stansfield, 101 F.3d 
909.  See also infra Part II.D (discussing the current split among the circuits regarding the 
federal nexus requirement of § 1512). 
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D. The Circuit Split 
One of the first circuits to construe the federal nexus requirement of 
§ 1512 was the Third Circuit in United States v. Stansfield105 and United 
States v. Bell.106  Following these decisions, other circuits, such as the 
Eleventh and Fourth Circuits, have construed this requirement of the 
statute broadly to extend the reach of § 1512.  The Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals has recently relied on both its earlier decisions and the Eleventh 
Circuit’s interpretation when applying the federal nexus requirement to 
prosecutions under § 1512.107 
In Stansfield, local officials obtained evidence through a three year 
investigation of a fire that destroyed the defendant’s home and that led 
local authorities to believe that the defendant had committed several 
federal crimes related to the suspected arson.108  Six months after federal 
officials began to investigate the defendant’s involvement in the arson, 
the defendant attacked and threatened a witness because he believed the 
witness had given authorities information about his involvement in the 
arson.109 
In upholding the defendant’s conviction of witness tampering, the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the government need not 
establish a federal investigation was pending or about to be instituted 
and rejected the government’s contention that it must only prove that the 
underlying offense was federal in nature or that the government need 
only show that the defendant acted with intent to prevent 
communication with law enforcement in general.110  Instead, the court 
                                                 
105 101 F.3d 909 (3d Cir. 1996). 
106 113 F.3d 1345 (3d Cir. 1997). 
107 Harris, 498 F.3d 278; Veal, 153 F.3d 1233; infra note 126 (noting that the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals in recent decisions claims adherence to Stansfield and Bell, but also 
appears to enunciate a broader test similar to that set forth by the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Veal). 
108 Stansfield, 101 F.3d at 911.  The court noted that the investigation began as a local 
investigation in order to determine the possible causes of the fire.  Id.  Once the local 
authorities determined that arson could be a possible cause of the fire, they contacted 
federal authorities to continue the investigation. Id.  Local authorities also transferred the 
investigation to federal authorities because of the possibility that the defendant used the 
federal mail system to perpetrate a fraud.  Id. 
109 Id. at 912.  The defendant used physical force against the witness’s parents and bound 
them in their basement while he prepared himself for the witness to appear.  Id.  Once the 
witness arrived home, the defendant threatened the witness with a loaded shotgun and 
asked him why he had spoken to the police about the defendant’s involvement in the 
arson.  Id.  After a struggle, the victims were able to gain control of the shotgun and subdue 
the defendant until the police arrived.  Id.  A grand jury indicted, and a jury later convicted, 
the defendant of tampering with a witness under § 1512.  Id.  The defendant was also 
indicted on eleven additional charges which are not relevant to the discussion of § 1512.  Id. 
110 Id. at 918.  In the case, the court specifically explained: 
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held that the government must show that the defendant acted with the 
intent to prevent any person’s communication with law enforcement 
authorities about an offense that was actually federal in nature, or 
“federal-in-fact,” and also that the defendant believed the person might 
communicate with federal authorities.111  Thus, according to the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals, the government establishes a sufficient federal 
nexus by showing that an offense is federal in nature and proving 
“additional appropriate evidence.”112 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals clarified this holding in United 
States v. Bell, a case which highlights why § 1512 is needed to protect 
witnesses.  In Bell, the defendant murdered the informant on the eve of 
the day that she was to testify against the defendant; the arrangement, 
whereby the informant was scheduled to testify, was made possible 
because of a joint federal and state investigation into drug trafficking.113  
                                                                                                             
[w]ere we to require only that the government prove that the 
underlying offense is federal and the defendant intended to prevent 
the witness from communicating with law enforcement officials in 
general, without also proving the defendant’s knowledge of or belief in 
the possibility that the witness would communicate with federal 
authorities, we would essentially vitiate an important facet of the 
intent requirement of the statute. 
Id. 
111 Id.  The court held that 
the government must prove . . . the defendant was motivated by a 
desire to prevent the communication between any person and law 
enforcement authorities concerning the commission or possible 
commission of an offense; . . . that offense was actually a federal 
offense; . . . and [] the defendant believed that the person . . . might 
communicate with the federal authorities. 
Id. The court found that the jury in Stansfield could reasonably infer the defendant 
believed Hoffman might communicate with federal authorities because the underlying 
offense of mail fraud was federal in nature and federal authorities had already begun to 
investigate, despite the defendant’s lack of actual knowledge that federal authorities were 
then involved in the investigation.  Id. at 919.  The initial crime of arson would not have 
brought the defendant under the purview of § 1512, but the use of the federal postal system 
to perpetrate the insurance fraud did.  Id. at 911.  The court held that the involvement of 
federal Postal Inspectors and the United States Attorney satisfied the requirement for 
additional appropriate evidence because the witness communicated with actual federal 
authorities and the government did not have to establish that the defendant knew the 
officials were federal authorities.  Id. at 917 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f) (2006)).   
112 Id. at 918.  The additional evidence that the court in Stansfield found appropriate was 
evidence that, at the time the defendant acted to interfere with the witness’s cooperation 
with the law enforcement officials, the investigation had been turned over to federal 
officials.  Id. 
113 United States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345, 1348 (3d Cir. 1997).  The Tri-County Drug Task 
Force (“Task Force”) which consists of local, state and federal investigators operates in 
three counties within Pennsylvania.  Id. at 1347.  The Task Force, prior to the investigation 
at issue in Bell, had previously developed federal and state criminal cases.  Id.  Similar 
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In upholding the defendant’s conviction of witness tampering under 
§ 1512, the court applied Stansfield and clarified that, while a jury may 
infer that a federal nexus exists from the fact that the underlying offense 
is actually a federal offense, the government must also prove the 
defendant believed that the witness might communicate with federal 
authorities regarding that offense.114  The government is not required to 
prove the defendant’s state of mind with regard to the federal nature of 
the authorities, but is required to prove that the defendant believed the 
witness would communicate with federal officers.115  In other words, the 
                                                                                                             
investigatory bodies exist in most states because federal and state cooperation is essential 
in drug trafficking investigations.  Kearney, supra note 2. 
 In Bell, the informant had provided information in an investigation of drug offenses in 
which Bell’s boyfriend was the prime suspect.  Bell, 113 F.3d at 1347.  After the informant 
was scheduled to testify at the resulting trial, defendant and several others kidnapped her, 
took her to an isolated location and killed her with the express intent to prevent her from 
testifying.  Id.  After the trial court acquitted the defendant of murder and witness 
tampering in a state court, federal authorities began their own investigation which led to 
the defendant’s conviction in federal court of murder and witness tampering.  Id.  Bell’s 
boyfriend, David Tyler, was convicted in a separate case.  United States v. Tyler, 281 F.3d 
84 (3d Cir. 2002).  See also United States v. Tyler, 167 N.J.L. 813, Feb. 25, 2002, at 1 (discussing 
the underlying facts of the witness tampering charges and both Tyler and Bell’s 
involvement). 
114 Bell, 113 F.3d at 1349 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating “we do not read [Stansfield] as requiring 
proof that the defendant believed the victim might communicate with law enforcement 
officers whom the defendant knew or believed to be federal officers.”) (emphasis in original).  In 
Bell, the court found that, although the Task Force had not begun an investigation 
specifically into the defendant’s conduct, the jury could properly infer that the defendant 
believed the witness’ cooperation with authorities would result in additional 
communication with the authorities regarding the defendant’s illegal drug activity.  Id. at 
1350.  The court found that the victim acted as an informant for the Task Force and that the 
defendant acted with the belief that her conduct would prevent the victim’s testifying 
regarding a federal drug offense.  Id. at 1347, 1350. 
115 Id. at 1349 (stating “the statute mandates . . . proof that the officers with whom the 
defendant believed the victim might communicate would in fact be federal officers.”).  Though 
the defendant in Bell may not have known the task force consisted of both local and federal 
authorities, the fact that the underlying drug offense was federal in nature was sufficient to 
establish a federal nexus because a jury could reasonably infer the defendant wished to 
prevent the witness’ communication with a partially federal law enforcement body 
regarding possible commission of federal crimes, and that at least one of the 
communications would have in fact been with a federal officer.  Id. at 1350.   
 Several other courts have used the phrase “happened to be federal.” See United States 
v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679 (3d Circ. 1999) (stating that all that the government must 
prove is “that the defendants had the intent to influence an investigation that happened to 
be federal.”); United States v. Perry, 335 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Applewhaite, 195 
F.3d 679 ) (finding there was sufficient evidence to establish the defendant intended to 
“influence an investigation that happened to be federal”).  Both the Third Circuit and other 
circuits have labeled this test using two different phrases, federal-in-fact test as enunciated 
in Stansfield or happens-to-to be federal as enunciated in Bell.  See Stansfield, 101 F.3d at 918; 
Bell, 113 F.3d at 1349.  The two tests seem to be functionally equivalent. 
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government must prove that at least one officer with whom a defendant 
wishes to prevent witness communication “happened to be” a federal 
officer.116 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals later explained its rationale 
behind its holdings in Stansfield and Bell in United States v. Applewhaite.117  
As noted by the court, Congress’s purpose for enacting § 1512 was to 
provide better protection to witnesses and victims of federal crimes and 
to protect the integrity of the process; thus, it is consistent with § 1512 to 
require only that the government establish the defendant intended to 
influence an investigation that happened to be federal.118  The Fifth 
                                                 
116 Bell, 113 F.3d at 1349 (stating that “the government must prove that at least one of the 
law-enforcement-officer communications which the defendant sought to prevent would 
have been with a federal officer, but that the government is not obligated to prove that the 
defendant knew or intended anything with respect to this federal involvement[]”).  See also 
Moore, supra note 44, at 843 (stating that § 1512 has been interpreted broadly to include 
situations in which the government could prove “at least one of the communications would 
have been with a federal officer[]”). 
 The government can prove that a sufficient federal nexus existed to convict the 
defendant under § 1512 if the government establishes that the underlying offense was 
federal in nature and provided appropriate additional evidence to prove that the defendant 
believed the witness would communicate to federal authorities.  Bell, 113 F.3d at 1349 
(quoting Stansfield, 101 F.3d at 918).  The court in Bell held that the jury could reasonably 
infer that the defendant intended to prevent future communications with the Task Force 
regarding federal drug crimes because the victim continued to provided information to the 
Task Force on drug related offenses in which the defendant was involved.  Id. at 1350. 
117 195 F.3d 679 (3d Cir. 1999).  The court in Applewhaite notes that the fact that the 
underlying offense is federal in nature creates a substantial likelihood that federal 
authorities will become involved in the investigation or prosecution of such crimes.  Id. at 
688.  The court states that an individual who commits a federal crime’s ignorance of the law 
is not relevant to whether the government can establish that she violated a federal statute. 
118 Id. at 688.  See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing S. Rep. No. 97-532, 
supra note 3, at 9, and the Congressional intent behind the enactment of § 1512); see also Bell, 
113 F.3d at 1350 (holding that the government need only prove that the defendant acted 
with the intention to interfere with a federal proceeding and not that the defendant knew 
of the federal nature of such proceeding).  The specific facts and the court’s ultimate 
holding in Applewhaite are a bit of an anomaly within cases brought under § 1512.  The 
specific facts of the case are unclear on whether the case was correctly in federal court, but 
the Third Circuit does speak to the issue.  Id. at 688.  The court holds that, regardless of 
whether a case is in federal court by accident or mistake, the fact that a case is incorrectly 
tried in federal court does not render § 1512 inapplicable.  Id.  The court specifically stated 
that: 
A federal prosecution remains federal in character for purposes of the 
umbrella of § 1512 even if it is in federal court only by accident or 
mistake.  The issue of whether authorities are correct when they select 
a federal forum over a state forum does not alter the federal nature of 
the prosecutions brought in federal court insofar as a violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1512 is concerned. 
Id.  See also Surette, supra note 32 (explaining the facts and holding of the court in 
Applewhaite). 
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Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Causey, and the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals in United States v. Rodriguez-Marerro and United States v. 
Baldyga, also apply this reasoning.119  However, other circuits, such as the 
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, apply a different analysis that provides 
victims greater protection under the VWPA.120 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Veal, 
convicted several city police detectives of tampering with witnesses with 
the intent to hinder or delay communication of a federal offense to 
federal authorities when they acted to mislead state investigators 
regarding civil rights violations allegedly committed by the detectives.121  
Noting that the legislative intent of the VWPA was to protect the 
integrity of federal investigations and proceedings, the court found 
                                                 
119 United States v. Rodriquez-Marrero, 390 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004); Baldyga, 233 F.3d 674 ; 
United States v. Causey, 185 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. 1999).   See also Sarah Roadcap, Obstruction of 
Justice, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 911, 932 n.127 (2004) (discussing the holding of Applewhaite and 
Causey).   
 While the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals claims to expressly reject the reasoning of the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Veal, it also appears to enunciate a test that is broader 
than the federal-in-fact test set forth by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.  Causey, 185 
F.3d at 422 (stating “we do not read [the statute] as requiring proof that the defendant 
believed the victim might communicate with law enforcement officers whom the defendant 
knew or believed to be federal officers.”) (quoting Bell, 113 F.3d at 1349) (emphasis added).  The 
First Circuit also appears to follow the federal-in-fact test but also mentions and discusses 
the decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Veal, 153 F.3d 1233. 
120 Veal, 153 F.3d 1233; Harris, 498 F.3d 278.  Recently, the Third Circuit cited to Veal in 
Guadalupe, 402 F.3d at 413.  However, the court did not extend the analysis of the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals to the decision in Guadalupe because it held that the government 
had proven sufficient additional evidence to satisfy the nexus requirement as set forth in 
Stansfield.   Guadalupe, 402 F.3d at 413.  Also, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Causey, 
expressly declined to follow the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit.  Causey, 185 F.3d at 422. 
 In Veal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals specifically addressed the federal nexus 
requirement of § 1512(b)(3). Veal, 153 F.3d at 1245.  The court in Veal found that other 
sections of § 1512 implicate different federal interests.  Id. at 1250.  For example, the federal 
interest in §§ 1512(a), (b)(1), and (b)(2) was “the status of the targeted person, potential 
witnesses in ‘official proceedings[.]’”  Id. at 1250–51 n.24.  However, the court did note that 
in these sections the “statute expressly states that the proceeding ‘need not be pending or 
about to be instituted at the time of the offense.’” Id.  However, the federal nexus 
requirement of other sections have been analyzed in the same manner.  See Diaz, 176 F.3d at 
91; and Baldyga, 233 F.3d at 680 n.5 (1st Cir. 2000). 
121 Veal, 153 F.3d at 1238.  In Veal, undercover police officers attacked a drug dealer they 
were investigating after being informed that the drug dealer had contracted to kill one of 
the police officers.  Id. at 1236.  The officers attempted to cover up the incident.  Id.  The 
officers lied to the initial investigators, including the crime-scene technician and Miami 
City homicide detectives.  Id. at 1237.  Three days after the attack, the FBI began a civil 
rights investigation into the incident.  Id. at 1238.  See also James P. Fleissner & Jeffrey R. 
Harris, Constitutional Criminal Procedure:  A Two Year Survey,  50 MERCER L. REV. 921, 939–41 
(1999) (discussing the facts and holding of Veal especially in the context of civil rights 
litigation). 
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sufficient evidence that the information, which was later transferred to 
federal authorities, established a federal nexus under the Act.122  
Specifically, the court held that the government need only prove the 
misleading information was “likely” to be transferred to federal 
authorities, not that the officials who initially received the information 
were federal officials.123   
Recently, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. 
Harris, chose to follow the broader interpretation as set forth by the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Veal, requiring only that the 
government prove the underlying offense was federal in nature and the 
potential existed for the information to be transferred to federal 
authorities.124  However, other circuits, including the First and Fifth 
Circuits, follow the reasoning set forth by the Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit in Stansfield and Bell, requiring that the government must 
                                                 
122 Veal, 153 F.3d at 1247.  The court also concluded that state investigators can, 
themselves, be considered witnesses under the plain language of § 1512.  Id.  Congressional 
intent behind enacting the act indicates that the Act encompassed law enforcement officials 
as witness.  Id.  Also, the Court noted that “the federal interest derives from the character of 
the affected activity, [i.e.,] the transmission of information to federal law enforcement agents 
and/or a federal judge concerning a possible federal crime.”)  Id. at 1251 (emphasis in 
original).  The Court went a step farther and stated that the nexus requirement as set forth 
in Aguilar was not controlling because § 1512 protected broader federal interests that § 1503 
was not meant to address.  Id.  See also Dana E. Hill, Anticipatory Obstruction of Justice:  Pre-
emptive Document Destruction under the Sarbanes-Oxley Anti-Shredding Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 
1519, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1519, 1531 n.65 (noting Veal’s distinguishing the nexus 
requirements under §§ 1503, 1505, & 1512); O’Sullivan, supra note 45, at 692–93 n.204 
(noting the determination of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals that the nexus 
requirement as set forth in Aguilar was not controlling). 
123 Veal, 153 F.3d at 1251.  The court found that “the federal interest derives from the 
character of the affected activity, the transmission of information to federal law enforcement 
agents and/or a federal judge concerning a possible federal crime.” Id. (emphasis in 
original).  Therefore, all the government had to prove was “the possibility or likelihood that 
. . . information would be transferred to federal authorities irrespective of the governmental 
authority represented by the initial investigators.”  Id. at 1251–52 (emphasis in original).  
The court in Veal relied on Stansfield and its progeny in elucidating this holding.  Id. at 1251 
n.26 (quoting Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909).  Specifically, the Veal court found that Stansfield 
stated that the possibility that a person “might communicate with the federal authorities” 
was sufficient to find a federal nexus.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
124 Harris, 498 F.3d at 286  (holding that “[s]o long as the information the defendant seeks 
to suppress actually relates to the commission or possible commission of a federal offense, 
the federal nexus requirement is established.”); Guadalupe, 402 F.3d at 413 (discussing the 
interpretation of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals of the federal nexus requirement, 
but finding sufficient additional evidence to convict applying the rational of Stansfield and 
Bell); Perry, 335 F.3d at321 n.7 (deciding not to apply the rationale of Veal in finding a 
sufficient showing of intent to interfere with an investigation which “‘happened to be 
federal’[]”); Applewhaite, 195 F.3d at 687 (discussing that a defendant could be convicted 
with witness tampering with a showing that the investigation “turns out to be federal[]” 
and the underlying offense is a federal crime). 
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prove additional evidence beyond the mere fact that the underlying 
offense was federal in nature in order to establish a sufficient federal 
nexus to prosecute under the VWPA.125  Several decisions by the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals, such as United States v. Applewhaite and United 
States v. Guadalupe, confirm the current tension in this area of the law.126 
III.  ANALYSIS:  THE CURRENT CONFUSION REGARDING THE APPLICATION OF 
THE FEDERAL NEXUS REQUIREMENT UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 1512 
While the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of whether a 
federal nexus must be established to prosecute a defendant under § 1512 
of the VWPA, courts disagree as to what evidence sufficiently supports 
the establishment of a federal nexus.127  The Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals established a standard in its early interpretation of the federal 
nexus requirement which many courts followed in convicting 
defendants under § 1512.128  Following these decisions, the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the statute broadly to extend the 
                                                 
125 Rodriquez-Marrero, 390 F.3d at 13 (citing Bell, 113 F.3d at 1350) (finding proof that 
federal authorities had already begun a federal investigation prior to the defendant’s act to 
tamper with a witness constitutes “appropriate additional evidence” under Stansfield and 
Bell); Perry, 335 F.3d at 321 (finding sufficient additional evidence that the defendant 
intended to influence an investigation that happened to be federal); Causey, 185 F.3d at 422  
(expressly rejecting the reasoning of Veal in holding that the government must prove the 
defendant acted with the intention to interfere with a federal investigation); Baldyga, 233 
F.3d at 680  (holding that in joint investigations the possibility exists that communications 
will eventually occur with federal authorities). 
126 Guadalupe, 402 F.3d at 413.  The court in Guadalupe discussed both Stansfield and Veal.  
Id.  While the court held that the government may establish a sufficient federal nexus by 
showing that the investigation later became federal, it also stated it “stay[ed] faithful to the 
teachings of Stansfield and Bell because there [was] ‘additional appropriate evidence’ . . . .” 
which established the federal nexus.  Id.  See also Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679  (convicting the 
defendant using the rationale of Stansfield and Bell but elucidating a broader “turns out to 
be federal” analysis in dicta).  The court in Applewhaite used such broad language as “turns 
out to be federal” in stating the required federal nexus under § 1512.  Id. at 687. 
127 See supra Parts II.C.1 & II.C.4.  As a starting point in determining the minimum federal 
connection required to be prosecuted under § 1512, courts look to the United States 
Supreme Court’s analysis on § 1503 decision in Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593.  See supra Part II.C.2 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s holding in Aguilar).  But see supra note 122 and 
accompanying text (discussing why the Eleventh Circuit does not find the nexus 
requirement as set forth in Aguilar controlling in prosecutions brought § 1512 ). 
128 See supra Part II.C.4.  The Court in Arthur Andersen established that some nexus must 
be establish in order to convict a defendant under § 1512.  Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 
708.  See also supra note 73 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s holding in Arthur 
Andersen).  However, prior to the decision in Arthur Andersen, the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals established a test to establish the requisite federal nexus under § 1512.  See supra 
notes 106-116 and accompanying text (explaining the holdings of the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909 and Bell, 113 F.3d 1345). 
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reach of § 1512.129  Recently, the Third Circuit has used both its earlier 
decisions and the interpretation by the Eleventh Circuit when applying 
the federal nexus requirement to prosecutions under § 1512.130  Finally, 
to add to the lack of uniformity among the circuits regarding the 
interpretation of the federal nexus requirement, the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals recently distinguished its earlier decisions relying on the 
interpretation of the Third Circuit Court Appeals to enunciate a test 
which expanded the reach of § 1512.131 
Part III.A first discusses the problems associated with the initial test 
set forth by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in its early cases.132  While 
several decisions have attempted to apply the language of Stansfield and 
Bell, no court, including the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, has applied 
the test with much consistency.133  Next, Part III.B will discuss the 
problems associated with the application of the Veal test.134 
A. The Practical Inapplicability of the Third Circuit’s Test 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals attempted to set forth a test to 
establish the jurisdictional requirement under § 1512 of the VWPA by 
enunciating its federal-in-fact test.135  In Stansfield and Bell, the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals in effect limited the reach of § 1512 to only 
cases that actually involved a full-blown federal investigation.136  
However, by limiting the jurisdiction of the Act to only those cases, 
many victims of federal crimes which the VWPA is meant to protect are 
left unprotected.137  Most victims and witnesses do not initially report 
crimes to federal officials.138 
                                                 
129 Veal, 153 F.3d 1233.  The Fifth Circuit expressly rejects the Third Circuit’s 
interpretation of § 1512’s nexus requirement and continues to apply the more limited 
interpretation used by the Third Circuit in its earlier cases.  See Causey, 185 F.3d 407. 
130 See supra note 126 and accompanying text (noting that the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals in recent decisions claims adherence to Stansfield and Bell, but also appears to 
enunciate a broader test similar to that set forth by the Eleventh Circuit of Appeals in Veal). 
131 Harris, 498 F.3d 278. 
132 Infra Part III.A. 
133 See infra note 117 (discussing the Third Circuit’s application of Stansfield and Bell in 
Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679; notes 118–19 and accompanying text (discussing the application  
by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals of the test set forth in Stansfield and Bell). 
134 Infra Part IV.A. 
135 See supra Part II.D.  As noted before, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals called its test 
the federal-in-fact test in Stansfield and then the happens-to-be-federal test in Bell.  See supra 
note 115 and accompanying text.  For all purposes, the two tests appear to be applied the 
same. 
136 See supra notes 106–16 and accompanying text (discussing the Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit’s enunciation of its federal-in-fact test in Stansfield and Bell). 
137 See supra Part II.A (discussing that Congressional intent behind the enactment of 
§ 1512 was to extend protection to a broader range of persons and safeguard the integrity 
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The federal-in-fact test does not extend protection to victims and 
witnesses who are attacked prior to federal officials becoming involved 
in investigations of federal crimes.139  The fact that federal officials 
become involved at a later date regarding the same investigation does 
not qualify as “additional appropriate evidence” under the test as 
interpreted by the circuits that follow it.140  Thus, a witness may not be 
protected if the government shows only that the offense was federal in 
nature and that federal officials were later involved.141 
However, the federal-in-fact test seems to completely overlook that 
the federal nature of a crime creates a substantial likelihood that federal 
agents will eventually investigate the crime.142  Also, the defendant’s 
subjective state of mind of whether he is violating a substantive federal 
law bears no relationship to whether the government can establish that 
the defendant’s conduct did violate substantive federal law.143  Thus, a 
defendant should not be allowed to declare ignorance of the law in 
claiming that he only intended to interfere with communications with 
local or state authorities.  The federal nature of the crime, while not 
dispositive,144 should be given great weight even when the investigation 
does not initially begin with federal officials.  Though the issue in 
Applewhaite involved officials choosing the wrong forum for the case, the 
analysis should be extended to witnesses.145  Simply because a witness 
may choose the wrong “forum” in which to report a crime, she should 
                                                                                                             
of the criminal justice system).  See also notes 29–30 and accompanying text (discussing the 
purpose behind the enactment of § 1512); note 118 and accompanying text (discussing one 
purpose behind the enactment of § 1512 was to safeguard the integrity of the judicial 
system). 
138 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (noting that most crimes fall under the 
jurisdiction of state and local agencies). 
139 See supra notes 106–16 and accompanying text (setting forth the federal-in-fact test of 
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit).  Under the reasoning of the Third Circuit in 
Stansfield and Bell and the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Causey, the official the witness is 
communicating with or might communicate with must in fact be a federal official at the 
time the witness is attempting to communicate.  See Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909; Bell, 113 F.3d 
1345; Causey, 185 F.3d 407. 
140 See Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909; Bell, 113 F.3d 1345. 
141 Stansfield, 101 F.3d at 918.  See also supra notes 106–12 and accompanying text 
(discussing the facts and reasoning underlying the court’s decision in Stansfield). 
142 See supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning of the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Applewhaite). 
143 Applewhaite, 195 F.3d  at 687.  See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
144 See supra notes 108–16 and accompanying text (discussing the holdings of the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals  in Stansfield and Bell—that the government must prove more than 
the fact that the underlying offense is federal in nature). 
145 See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s finding that a federal 
prosecution remains federal in nature regardless of whether it is in federal court by 
mistake).  See also Applewhaite, 195 F.3d at 688. 
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not be precluded from protection under a federal statute meant to 
provide protection to her.  This result is entirely appositive to Congress’s 
intent in enacting the VWPA to protect victims of federal crimes.146 
Two Circuits appear to apply the rationale of Stansfield and Bell 
when deciding whether a sufficient federal nexus exists to convict a 
defendant under § 1512.147  However, both the First and Fifth Circuits 
distort the test.  The First Circuit appears to apply the Third Circuit’s 
federal-in-fact test and also adds the decision of the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Veal to the discussion, whereas the Fifth Circuit has 
clearly refused to follow the decision in Veal and does not appear to 
adhere to the test set forth by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Bell.148  In contradiction to the holding in Bell, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that the defendant’s knowledge or belief that the 
authorities were federal officials is irrelevant.149 
Also, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in recent cases has lessened 
the burden on the government in establishing a sufficient federal nexus, 
in contradiction to its earlier decision.150  In light of these cases, the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals appears to be interpreting § 1512 differently 
than it did initially.151  In fact, the court stated that the government may 
establish a sufficient federal nexus by simply showing that a defendant 
intended to interfere with a communication that was likely to be 
transferred to federal authorities, regardless of whether the investigation 
started at the local level.152  This holding is not entirely consistent with 
the earlier holdings of the Third Circuit.153  Thus, circuit courts have not 
                                                 
146 See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text (discussing congressional enactment of 
§ 1512 of the VWPA). 
147 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.  See also United States v. Rodriquez-
Marrero, 390 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Baldyga, 233 F.3d 674 (1st Cir. 2000); 
Causey, 185 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. 1999). 
148 See supra note 119 accompanying text (noting the discrepancy in the decision by the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals).  See also Causey, 185 F.3d at 422.  The Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals cites directly to the decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Bell.  Id. at  
422. 
149 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.  
150 Guadalupe, 402 F.3d 409.  See supra note 126 and accompanying text.  The court itself 
stated that its decision in Applewhaite was more closely in line with the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision than with the Third Circuit’s earlier decisions.  Guadalupe, 402 F.3d at 413. 
151 See supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing the decisions of the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Guadalupe and Applewhaite). 
152 Guadalupe, 402 F.3d at 413.  The exact language used by the court is: 
All that was required [to show a violation of § 1512] was the possibility or 
likelihood that [the defendants’] false and misleading information would be 
transferred to federal authorities irrespective of the governmental authority 
represented by the initial investigators. 
Id. (quoting Veal, 153 F.3d at1251–52 ) (emphasis in original). 
153 See supra Part II.D.  The Third Circuit stated in Stansfield: 
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consistently applied the same standard in determining what constitutes a 
sufficient federal nexus under § 1512.   
The lack of clarity, which exists within the Third Circuit and the 
circuits which purport to apply its earlier jurisprudence, makes it unclear 
exactly what the government must show to establish a sufficient federal 
nexus to satisfy the jurisdictional element of § 1512 in that jurisdiction.154  
Even though § 1512 has been found to not violate the Fifth Amendment 
due process rights of a defendant, this schizophrenic application of the 
statute does not provide defendant’s with adequate notice of what types 
of possible investigations would be protected under § 1512.155   
Furthermore, the original interpretation of § 1512 by the Third 
Circuit, which has been followed by the First and Fifth Circuits, appears 
too restrictive in requiring that the officer with whom the witness wishes 
to communicate be a federal officer.  This requirement does not truly 
comport with the purpose of § 1512.  The congressional intent for the 
enactment of § 1512 of the VWPA appears to encompass investigations 
that may include local authorities investigating federal crimes in 
cooperation with federal officials.156  Some of the case law within the 
First, Third, and Fifth Circuits does not appear to take this intent into 
consideration and has limited the jurisdiction of § 1512 too severely.  
                                                                                                             
Were we to require only that the government prove that the 
underlying offense is federal and that the defendant intended to 
prevent the witness from communicating with law enforcement 
officials in general, without also proving the defendant’s knowledge of 
or belief in the possibility that the witness would communicate with 
federal authorities, we would essentially vitiate an important facet of 
the intent requirement of the statute. 
United States v. Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909, 918 (3d Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original).  See also 
supra notes 106-116 and accompanying text (discussing the earlier decisions of the Third 
Circuit in Stansfield and Bell). 
154 See supra notes 106–19 and accompanying text.  In Stansfield, an investigation which 
began locally, became protected under § 1512 six months after the investigation began.  See 
supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text (discussing the facts underlying the Third 
Circuit’s decision in Stansfield).  In Bell, a joint task force which had regularly consisted of 
both local and federal authorities provided a sufficient federal connection as to bring the 
investigation and any witnesses involved under the protection of § 1512.  See supra notes 
113–16 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345 (3d Cir. 
1997).  However, in Applewhaite, the court held that a case in federal court by accident or 
mistake would still be protected under § 1512.  See supra notes 117–18 and accompanying 
text (discussing United States v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
155 See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutionality of § 
1512).  The fact that a defendant cannot predict what conduct would be proscribed 
implicates due process concerns. 
156 See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent to 
provide broad protection to victims and witnesses of federal crimes).  See also supra note 122 
and accompanying text (noting the discussion of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals of 
the congressional intent behind § 1512). 
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However, the broader interpretation of the statute enunciated by the 
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits also presents problems. 
B. The Problems Associated With Veal and Harris 
The rationale of the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits also presents 
problems because most serious crimes fall under the jurisdiction of the 
states.157  As stated by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the purpose 
for congressional enactment of § 1512 was to provide protection to 
victims and witnesses of federal crimes while ensuring the integrity of 
criminal investigations and proceedings.158  However, courts that apply a 
more stringent test upon the government to establish a close relationship 
between the defendant’s interference with a witness and a federal 
investigation or proceeding argue that a lesser standard would infringe 
upon the jurisdiction of the states.159  On the other hand, those that apply 
a lesser standard argue that, on many occasions, state and federal 
investigators corroborate when investigating criminal conduct that 
constitutes a federal crime.160  
The analysis of the federal nexus requirement should be conducted 
in a functional manner so as to cover all conduct which functions to 
tamper with witnesses “in order to frustrate the ends of justice[,]”161 but 
also in a way that does not infringe upon the jurisdiction of the states.  
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals asserts that in order to fulfill the 
objectives of § 1512 and to protect the integrity of the potential federal 
investigation, prosecutions must be allowed when witness tampering 
affects the transfer of information regarding a commission or possible 
commission of a federal crime from state and local authorities to federal 
law enforcement.162  However, the method used by both the Fourth and 
Eleventh Circuits presents the possibility that the federal courts may 
                                                 
157 S. Rep. No. 97-532, supra note 3, at 10 (noting that “the majority of serious violent 
crimes fall within the jurisdiction of the state and local law enforcement agencies.”).  See 
also supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
158 United States v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679 (3d Cir. 1999). 
159 See United States v. Causey, 185 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. 1999. 
160 See Harris, 498 F.3d 278.  See also Kearney, supra note 2. 
161 United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233, 1247 (11th Cir. 1998). 
162 Harris, 498 F.3d at 285 (quoting Perry, 335 F.3d at 321) (stating that “‘the federal 
interest of protecting the integrity of potential federal investigations by ensuring that 
transfers of information to federal law enforcement . . . relating to the possible commission 
of federal offenses be truthful and unimpeded.’”).  This rationale is also supported by the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Aguilar,  515 U.S. 593 (1995) 
(stating in dicta that the fact that the witness may never have communicated the 
information to any authority is irrelevant in determining that the defendant intended to 
prevent the witness from doing so).  See supra Part II.C.2 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Court’s rationale and Justice Scalia’s dissent). 
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intrude upon the jurisdiction of state agencies and courts.163  Both sides 
of the debate claim to be interpreting the plain language of the statute.  
The differing interpretations indicate that Congress should speak again 
and amend the statute to provide clear and concise guidelines as to what 
satisfies the jurisdictional element of § 1512. 
Jurisdictions that limit the reach of the statute run the risk of leaving 
out ancillary investigations that are integral to the integrity of the federal 
criminal system.  However, jurisdictions that interpret the federal nexus 
requirement broadly run the risk of overstepping state and local 
jurisdictions.164  However, Congress should amend the statute to provide 
clear guidance to courts of its intent—specifically, which proceedings or 
investigations would fall under the protection of § 1512 of the VWPA.165 
IV.  PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 18 U.S.C. § 1512 
Congress should amend 18 U.S.C. § 1512 because current law is 
unclear as to which victims and witnesses would qualify for protection 
under the Act.166  A victim should not be precluded from the protection 
of the Act simply for reporting the crime to the wrong authorities.  If 
state or local authorities eventually contact federal authorities regarding 
information received in an initial investigation, the victim or witness 
should be protected under the VWPA.167   
Consequently, this Note proposes that § 1512 of the VWPA be 
amended by adding language to the substantive sections of the statute 
and by adding an additional subsection to the Act to clarify the federal 
nexus requirement.  These additions will help the current statute better 
comport with the original congressional intent behind the statute and 
                                                 
163 S. Rep. No. 97-532, supra note 3.  See also supra note 9 and accompanying text 
(discussing the purpose behind the enactment of § 1512 and recognizing the jurisdiction of 
state and local systems over most serious violent crimes). 
164 See supra Part II.D (discussing differing constructions of § 1512).  Justice Scalia’s 
dissent in Aguilar supports the position that the obstruction statutes should be read broadly 
to provide protection to all victims and witnesses of federal crimes.  Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 
(Scalia J., dissenting).  Also, some of the language of the majority’s decision seems to 
indicate a disposition to read the jurisdictional elements of the obstruction acts broadly.  Id. 
165 See infra Part IV. 
166 See supra Part III (discussing the problems associated with the current state of the law 
regarding the interpretation of the federal nexus requirement of § 1512). 
167 See supra notes 120–23 and accompanying text (discussing Veal and its reasoning to 
interpret § 1512 broadly to provide protection to victims whose communications with local 
authorities are transferred to federal authorities). 
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provide protection to all persons who deserve protection under the Act 
via amendments and adding a new section.168  
First, the Act should be amended to allow protection to victims and 
witnesses whose communication with local or state authorities is 
transferred to federal officials to be used in a federal investigation or 
proceeding.  Second, the Act should be amended to set forth relevant 
factors in determining whether an investigation constitutes a federal 
investigation as to bring cooperating witnesses or victims under the 
protection of the Act.  Thus, the statute should be amended to read: 
(a)(1) Whoever kills or attempts to kill another person, 
with intent to . . . 
(c) prevent the communication or transmission of 
the communication by any person to a law 
enforcement officer or judge of the United States 
of information relating to the commission or 
possible commission of a Federal offense or a 
violation of conditions of probation, parole, or 
release pending judicial proceedings; 
(2) Whoever uses physical force or the threat of 
physical force against any person, or attempts to do 
so, with intent to— . . .  
(c) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication 
or transmission of the communication to a law 
enforcement officer or judge of the United States 
of information relating to the commission or 
possible commission of a Federal offense or a 
violation of conditions of probation, supervised 
release, parole, or release pending judicial 
proceedings; shall be punished as provided in 
paragraph (3) . . . 
(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or 
corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do 
so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another 
person, with intent to— . . . 
(3) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication or 
transmission of the communication to a law enforcement 
officer or judge of the United States of information 
relating to the commission or possible commission of 
                                                 
168 See supra note 40 and accompanying text (citing the current version of § 1512).  See also 
notes 28–30 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative intent behind enactment of 
§ 1512 of the VWPA). 
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a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of 
probation, supervised release, parole, or release 
pending judicial proceedings; 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than ten years, or both . . .  
(c) Whoever corruptly— 
(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, 
document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with 
the intent to impair the object’s integrity or 
availability for use in an official proceeding; or 
(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any 
official proceeding, or attempts to do so, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned . . . . 
(d) Whoever intentionally harasses another person and 
thereby hinders, delays, prevents, or dissuades any 
person from—. . .  
(3) reporting to a law enforcement officer or judge of 
the United States the commission or possible 
commission of a Federal offense or a violation of 
conditions of probation supervised release, parole, or 
release pending judicial proceedings; . . .  
or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than a year, or both.169 
Commentary 
 
First, several courts already recognize that, in reality, investigations 
of the commission or possible commission of a federal crime do not exist 
in a vacuum where victims and witnesses report the crime directly to 
federal officials.170  Most crimes are reported directly to local and state 
officials who then determine whether federal involvement is 
necessary.171  The information communicated to local and state officials 
                                                 
169 This proposal is the contribution of the author.  The proposed additions are italicized 
and the language in regular font is taken directly from § 1512.  See generally  18 U.S.C. 
§ 1512.  For purposes of this amendment, transmission shall be defined according to the 
common legal usage.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines transmit as “1. To send or transfer (a 
thing) from one person or place to another.  2. To communicate.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1537 (8th ed. 2004). 
170 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (noting, after the holding of the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Harris that federal and local officials recognize the need to cooperate, 
especially in the area of drug crimes). 
171 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing federal recognition that most 
violent crimes are investigated and prosecuted by state officials). 
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is then transferred to federal officials once they become involved in the 
investigation or completely take control.172  Victims and witnesses cannot 
be expected to determine that a crime is federal in deciding to whom 
they will report a crime.  This does not comport with any rational 
understanding of how the criminal justice system works. 
The proposed amendment recognizes this reality by expressly 
providing protection under § 1512 to individuals who assist in any 
federal investigation regardless of when and with whom they first 
initially communicated.  The amendment does not broaden protection 
beyond that which was originally intended by Congress in 1982, but 
assures that individuals who fall within the meaning of the statute are 
provided the protection intended by Congress.  The added language also 
comports with the legislative intent to provide broad protection to 
individuals who unfortunately become victims or witnesses of federal 
crimes.173 
Second, one stated purpose of the VWPA is to protect the integrity of 
the criminal justice system.174  Local and state officials must be able to 
rely on their federal counterparts in order to adequately investigate and 
prosecute crimes.175  In turn, victims and witnesses must be able to trust 
the system to provide them with justice and protection.  The proposed 
amendment better fulfills this purpose of the Act by expressly 
recognizing that information that is integral to a federal investigation or 
prosecution may not be communicated directly to federal authorities, but 
to local or state authorities who work in conjunction with federal 
authorities. 
Finally, the proposed amendment stays true to other language used 
within § 1512 and language used by several courts interpreting the Act 
more narrowly.176  The Act itself states that a proceeding need not be 
pending in order for the victim or witness to be protected.177  The 
proposed amendment extends this rational to investigations by 
providing protection to individuals against possible conduct that 
                                                 
172 See supra notes 120–23 and accompanying text (relating the facts of Veal and the 
rationale of the Eleventh Circuit as finding a sufficient federal nexus to prosecute the 
defendant for witness intimidation). 
173 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (discussing that Congress intended to 
broaden protection of victims and witnesses and to protect the integrity of the judicial 
system).  See also supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning of the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals  in United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 1998)). 
174 See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text (discussing Veal). 
175 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (referring to one official’s reaction to the 
decision in Harris). 
176 See supra notes 106–16 and accompanying text (discussing Stansfield and Bell). 
177 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f).  See also supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing 
subsection 1512(g)). 
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occurred before the investigation is turned over to federal authorities.178  
Also, early cases decided by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
enunciated the rule that a sufficient federal nexus could be established 
by showing that the underlying offense was federal in nature while also 
showing proof of additional appropriate evidence.179  The fact that 
information collected in a local or state investigation is turned over to 
federal investigators to continue the investigation or prosecution should 
be sufficient to establish additional appropriate evidence to satisfy the 
nexus requirement of the Act.  In addition, the proposed amendment 
will provide for greater uniformity in the application of § 1512.180 
In addition to the above proposed amendment, a new subsection 
should be added to § 1512 regarding factors to be considered when 
determining whether a victim or witness shall receive protection under 
the Act.  The following should also be added to the Section: 
(f) For the purposes of this section-- 
(1) an official proceeding need not be pending or 
about to be instituted at the time of the offense;  
(2) an investigation regarding the commission or 
possible commission of a federal  falls under the purview 
of this section if:   
(a) the underlying offense is in fact a federal crime 
as proscribed by the United States Code; and 
(b) additional factors exist to establish prosecution 
under this section.  Such additional factors to be 
considered include, but are not limited to:   
(i) the underlying offense is one which both 
local and federal authorities commonly conduct 
joint investigations; 
(ii) federal officials have frequently been 
contacted by local authorities to assist in 
investigations regarding similar conduct; 
(iii) the underlying investigation resulting in the 
possible violation of this section did, in fact, 
result in a federal investigation, whether jointly 
with local or state officials or solely conducted by 
federal officials; 
                                                 
178 This protection is in the form of any deterrent effect the threat of possible federal 
prosecution for witness intimidation may have on a defendant. 
179 See supra notes 106–16 and accompanying text (discussing the tests set forth by the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Stansfield and Bell). 
180 See supra Part II.D (discussing the lack of uniformity among the circuits). 
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(iv) the defendant was subsequently charged 
with a federal crime; and 
(v) the underlying offense the defendant was 
subsequently convicted of was in fact a federal 
crime. 
(vi) the testimony, or the record, or other object 
need not be admissible in evidence or free of a 
claim of privilege. 
(3) the testimony, or the record, document, or other 
object need not be admissible in evidence or free of a 
claim or privilege.181 
Commentary 
 
The proposed amendment to the Act extends the protection of § 1512 
to possible investigations. The balancing test, which takes into account 
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the underlying crime and 
the alleged witness tampering, protects against federal encroachment on 
state issues.182  The factors listed assure that a sufficient federal nexus 
exists before federal authorities can prosecute defendants under the Act, 
thus assuaging concerns that the proposed amendment is overbroad.183  
Victims and witnesses of federal crimes who initially report crimes to 
local or state officials will only qualify for protection if, and when, the 
investigation or prosecution is transferred to federal officials.  Victims 
and witnesses should not be expected or required to know which crimes 
constitute a federal crime.  This lack of knowledge should not preclude 
the victim or witness from protection under the VWPA. 
This proposed amendment also restricts the scope of the 
aforementioned amendment which some may claim extends beyond the 
reach of federal authorities into the realm of exclusive state authority.184  
Federal prosecutors and judges are limited by the proposed test to 
situations where a clear federal interest is present.  Thus, the proposed 
amendment alleviates concerns that federal authorities will be able to 
                                                 
181 This proposal is the contribution of the author.  The proposed additions are italicized 
and the language in regular font is taken directly from § 1512.  See generally 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1512. 
182 See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text (noting congressional federalism 
concerns regarding the enactment of the VWPA). 
183 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (citing cases which discuss the 
constitutionality of § 1512 of the VWPA). 
184 See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
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encroach upon states’ rights.  This amendment also cures any 
overbreadth or due process concerns.185 
Finally, this proposed amendment will better ensure uniformity 
across the several federal jurisdictions by setting forth the specific factors 
to be considered under the Act.  The proposal provides guidance to 
federal officials, especially federal judges regarding whether specific 
conduct is proscribed under § 1512. 
Ultimately, both proposed amendments work together to provide 
victims and witnesses with adequate protection while ensuring that the 
purpose of the statute is met.  Also, the proposed amendments limit the 
reach of the Act to situations where a federal nexus is indeed established.  
The proposed amendments will also allow for uniformity and certainty 
within the federal jurisdictions because they provide needed guidance to 
state and federal courts regarding the protection of victims and 
witnesses in joint investigations. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Returning to Mark, the unfortunate witness to a federal crime who 
was subsequently attacked in order to prevent his cooperation with 
authorities,186 had Congress made the jurisdictional aspect of § 1512 
more clear at the outset, individuals like Mark would not be 
experiencing such disparate treatment depending upon which federal 
circuit in which they reside or in which circuit the crime occurs.  Based 
on the facts as described, Mark would be protected in both jurisdictions 
because the proposed amendments close the gap which exists in the 
current statute.  Also, amending § 1512 would result in better protection 
to all persons that the original Act intended to protect.  Finally, the 
proposed amendments would foster cooperation among state and 
federal authorities in resolving concurrent and joint investigations. 
In sum, current law fails to adequately protect individuals when 
they initially report federal crimes to local authorities.  The legislative 
history underlying the enactment of the VWPA indicates that Congress 
intended to provide broader protection to victims and witnesses of 
federal crimes than was provided for under previous obstruction of 
                                                 
185 See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutionality of 
§ 1512). 
186 See supra Part I. 
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justice statutes.  However, courts have struggled in defining the exact 
scope of this protection and many victims and witnesses are still left 
unprotected under the Act. 
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